30/1/2005

General Context

On January 9, 2005, Palestinians attended polls in a presidential election in order to choose a new president for the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) to succeed the late President Yasser Arafat. The elections were organized in accordance with Article 37 of the Palestinian Basic Law and Law 13 of 1995 Relating to Elections. The Palestinian Central Election Commission (CEC) which is reported to be independent and non-partisan was responsible for the electoral process in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The process included voter education, the electoral register, the design and operation of polling stations, the provision of security, the tally of votes, responses to complaints, and the declaration of results.

East Jerusalem faced particular challenges during the election as it falls under Israeli control so was not considered within CECs jurisdiction. Although, Israel considers Jerusalem part of its territory, under International Law and United Nations resolutions, East Jerusalem is technically considered as occupied territory. Palestinians who live in Jerusalem are not considered Israeli citizens. The majority of visible violations witnessed by Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies (ICDS) delegates occurred in East Jerusalem rather than the West Bank. In general, the ongoing violence, occupation, and restrictions on freedom of movement combined to create an environment which may not have encouraged a free and fair election. These elements were particularly salient in hot spots such as East Jerusalem, Hebron, Tulkarem, Nablus and the Gaza Strip where most of the reported violations, irregularities, and confusion took place.

Monitoring Trajectory (Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies)

In order to collect an adequate sample, both qualitatively and quantitatively, ICDS delegates visited ten polling stations in: East Jerusalem, the larger district of Jerusalem under PNA control and the West Bank. This choice of trajectory allowed comparison between daily election events under Israeli control and the daily election events under CEC control.

The following polling stations were monitored (in temporal order):
1. Altoor Post Office (East Jerusalem)
2. Salahadin Street Post Office (East Jerusalem)
3. Hebron Door (Bab Al Khalil) Post Office (East Jerusalem)
4. Shufat Post Office (East Jerusalem)
5. Al Ram Civil Registry Center (larger district of Jerusalem)
6. Az Zaayyem Civil Registry (larger district of Jerusalem)
7. Al Eizariya Polling Center and Civil Registry (larger district of Jerusalem)
8. Abu Dis Civil Registry (larger district of Jerusalem)
9. Anata Civil Registry (larger district of Jerusalem)
10. Bethlehem Polling Center (West Bank)

Campaigning
The ICDS delegation witnessed several violations to the elections Law no.13 of 1995. A Presidential Decree issued on December 7, 2004, called for a halt to campaigning 48 hours prior to elections, campaign posters for candidate Mahmoud Abbas, as well as supporters carrying campaign materials were present within all polling stations that ICDS monitored on election day. This was in clear violation of both the Presidential Decree and Article 56 of Law 13 which prohibits the placement of campaign posters in the vicinity of polling stations. In addition, the PNA contributed campaign resources to Mahmoud Abbas, the Fatah candidate, violating Article 54 which stipulates neutrality of official administrative and security bodies throughout the electoral process.
Furthermore, official media demonstrated a clear bias for the Fatah candidate breaching Article 57 of the Law Relating to Elections. For example, Palestine TV, the official channel, allocated 94% of its electoral campaign coverage to Mahmoud Abbas. It is also important to note that Israelis restricted the freedom of movement of candidates, other than Mahmoud Abbas, when campaigning in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Several campaigns were hindered when candidates attempted to cross through the extensive maze of checkpoints. For example, Dr. Mustafa Al Barghouthi was arrested by Israeli security at checkpoints twice during his campaign.

Voting procedures
Voter registration and access to polling stations

According to official estimates, a voter education campaign conducted by the CEC in the additional registration period occurring between Novembed 24 December 1, 2004, was successful in raising the number of registered voters from 67% to 71% of eligible voters in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Voting in East Jerusalem was especially problematic due to the closure of Palestinian polling centers by Israeli authorities at the start of voter registration in September 2004. The premature closure of these registration centers on September 13, 2004, only 9 days after the initiation of the registration drive, is attributed to low registration rates as it allowed only 5,376 of a total of 200,000 eligible voters from East Jerusalem to vote in Israeli post offices throughout the city. This number amounts to less than 3%.

East Jerusalem
Most of the violations and much of the confusion confronting ICDS delegates on Election Day occurred in the post offices under the direct control of the Israeli government. For example, discrepancies existed between two voter lists at the Altoor Post office. In addition, in all post offices most voters including those registered at the respective post office, were denied access to voting booths. Officials stated that their name was not on the list of people eligible to vote in East Jerusalem. Confusion arose as well when some eligible voters possessed registry slips that did not specifying a particular location. They were informed by officials at the registration centers to go to a other post offices.

Voters, whose names werent found in voter lists, were told to go to civil registry centers in the greater district of Jerusalem, designed for residents of East Jerusalem. However, most of the voters showed reluctance to travel the minimum distance of 15 km through checkpoints to exercise their right to vote. Several voters interviewed by ICDS delegates feared they would be allowed back through the checkpoints that divide Israeli-controlled Jerusalem from Palestinian areas one the entered the West Bank. As well, some East Jerusalem voters may have been dissuaded in exercising their right to vote due to pre-election rumors initiated by several Israeli media sources. Rumor claimed that residents of East Jerusalem who chose to participate in the Palestinian elections could lose special privileges such as health insurance, free movement through checkpoints, and the possession of the blue-identity card.

These factors may have resulted in an extremely low voter turnout in East Jerusalem. Despite the creation of 12 special civil registry centers where unregistered, eligible Palestinians could cast their votes, there remained an issue of low voter turnout. The international group of monitors lead by former President Jimmy Carter negotiated an agreement with the Israeli Prime Ministers Office that allowed Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem to vote inside the city with their ID cards, whether their name appeared on the list of those eligible to vote in the city or not. However, poor execution of the agreement resulted in a lack of consistency in its practice or application across various post offices.

As well, an agreement between the Israeli government and the CEC to allow international observers with CEC accreditation to accede to the polling centers was breached. For example, access to the voting poll at Altoor post office was denied international observers who possessed CEC accreditation but did not possess an Israeli authentication card, clearly violating the agreement.

Further irregularities were reported concerning voter anonymity and privacy. It was noted that the presence of Israeli security outside the polling stations created an atmosphere of anxiety resulting in further confusion within polling stations. As well, the ballot boxes inside the polling stations were not transparent. Israeli officials, considering voters in East Jerusalem to be absentee-voters, used standard mail boxes in the place of transparent voter boxes. Employees of the Israeli Post Office were responsible for manning the voting process. This task was combined with the continued task of providing postal services to customers. ICDS observers at AlToor polling station witnessed the ten minute interruption of a voter in the process of voting when a postal official left the voter to attend a postal customer. Furthermore, contrary to CEC stipulations, privacy was not provided at the actual casting of the vote. Voters were obliged to cast their ballots at the postal counter window in clear view of the postal clerks attending the process.

West Bank
The CEC set up more than 1,000 polling stations across the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In addition, 71 Civil Registry Centers were established for unregistered voters, whose names appear on the Palestinian Civil Registry. Despite measures that would otherwise encourage and facilitate a strong voter turnout, by midday voter turnout remained very low. Official estimates placed voter turnout at 35% of registered voters.

To increase voter participation, polling hours were extended an addition 2 hours, from 7:00 to 9:00 PM. As well, a decision was made to allow any person proving Palestinian residency to vote regardless of the fact their name appeared absent on the civil registry. Haste in implementing the decision clearly resulted in confusion among voters and elections officials. At the closing of the polls, official estimates of voter registration reached 65% of all registered voters. In regards to unregistered voters, 10% of those eligible to vote turned out at the polls. The 70,000 unregistered votes did not affect the final results, as Mahmoud Abbas took the election with a wide margin.

Unlike East Jerusalem, West Bank ICDS delegates did not report violations in voter access to polling stations nor confusion or discrepancy in voter registration lists. The entire voting process proceeded smoothly and in accordance to CEC regulations including the presence of CEC officials, representatives of presidential candidates, and local and international observers. However, the ICDS delegation reported that as polls closed, election officials appeared more defensive and withheld information to observers about estimates of the number of voters. This was attributed to the fact that voter turnout was not exemplary. An election official at the Anata polling station reported to the ICDS delegate that at midday he received instructions by telephone from the District Electoral Office not to disclose any specific information to international observers regarding voter turnout. International Observers raised questions concerning the nature of the ink used to mark the thumb of voters to discourage attempts to vote again at different civil registry centers. Unsubstantiated allegations surfaced that the ink could in fact be removed even though it was believed to last for 24 hours.

Tally Process
After the polls closed, ICDS delegates remained at the Bethlehem polling station to tally the vote. The tally process was transparent; it occurred in the presence of international and local observers and representatives of presidential candidates. These same officials checked the ballots after the tally was complete. Furthermore, all representatives of presidential candidates oversaw and signed the tally protocol. The protocol indicating the results was then placed outside the polling station as public information. East Jerusalem was the only district where the tally of ballots did not occur at the polling stations in the presence of observers and candidate representatives. After the closure of polling centers, the ballot boxes were ferried by Israeli postal vehicles to CEC officials for tallying.

The results at the Bethlehem polling station were:
Mahmound Abbas: 63.6%
Mustafa al Barghouthi: 22.3%
Tayseer Khaled: 3.2%
Abd AlHalim Ashqar: 2.4%
Assayed Barakeh: 1.8%
Bassam Al Salhi: 1.0%
Abd Al-Karim Shbair: 0.2%
Invalid Ballots: 2.3%
Empty Ballots: 3.2%

These results closely reflect nation-wide results as listed:
Mahmoud Abbas: 62.6%
Mustafa Barghouthi: 19.5%
Tayseer Khaled: 3.4 %
Abd Alhalim Ashqar: 2.7%
Basam Al Salhi: 2.7%
Assayed Barakeh: 1.3%
Abd Al-Karim Shbair: 0.7%
Invalid Ballots: 3.7%
Blank Ballots: 3.4%

Conclusions
With the exception of East Jerusalem, no major systemic violations were reported. In this regard, ICDS along with other international observers including the European Union and the National Democratic Institute considered the 2005 Palestinian presidential elections a victory for democracy. Concern remains that candidates were not provided equal opportunity in electoral campaigning. A biased PNA and media endorsement of the Fatah candidate did not provide a level playing field to other candidates.

In addition, the fact that Hamas boycotted the elections may indicate that a significant proportion of the population did not voice its preference, especially in the Gaza Strip and in Hebron, where the movement experiences wide popularity. Furthermore, most eligible voters the ICDS delegates interviewed reported a loss of faith in the democratic process. They further reported they believed that Mahmoud Abbas victory was predetermined regardless of voters choices. It is understandable that the elections were less than ideal given the fact that these elections were the first to occur in the Occupied Territories since 1996 and they took place in a climate of occupation, authoritarian rule and violence.

Under any circumstance democracy, being a gradual and all-encompassing process, cannot flourish automatically. Hence, the 2005 presidential elections, however successful, do not present a complete solution to the Palestinian political impasse. It remains to be seen if the upcoming Palestinian parliamentary elections will bring to power a more diverse political spectrum in a genuine power-sharing scheme among the Palestinian factions, where power is not monopolized by Fatah.