Egyptian Democracy Support Network

Update, September 8, 2005

Egypt's first competitive presidential election saw tremendous efforts from opposition parties and civil society, eager to make the most of an important, albeit narrow democratic opening. Campaigns were hard fought and nearly 4,000 domestic monitors were trained and dispatched by four different coalitions of NGOs. Security forces repeatedly expressed a desire to cooperate with civil society organizations; foreign journalists and onlookers were not hindered, and the election was largely free of violence. However, the government-appointed Presidential Election Commission's (PEC) voluntary mismanagement of the overall process paved the way for mass confusion, widespread fraud and several other irregularities.

On September 3rd, an administrative court ruled in favor of civil society coalitions who had filed suit demanding the right of their domestic monitors to enter the polling stations. The PEC quickly returned to the court, challenged its jurisdiction, and on September 6th, the administrative court replied by withdrawing its ruling and sidestepping the controversy altogether. The PEC now seemed poised to follow though on its September 16th declaration that domestic monitors not be allowed.

However, in a late reversal of that policy, the Commission announced three hours after the polls opened that monitors could enter the stations, if they first went to the PEC headquarters and obtained the appropriate signed paperwork. This was impossible for those outside of Cairo and even monitors who were close to the PEC's New Cairo headquarters were unable to obtain the paper work when they attempted to do so. Employees at the PEC were apparently unaware that the television announcement had been made, and thus unprepared to offer the promised documentation. Without documentation or explicit instructions, the PEC decision was not executed by the judges and election officials at the polling stations. Thus, the vast majority of domestic observers—as well as party representatives—were denied access to polling stations; while the PEC patted itself on the back for allowing their presence.

Perhaps most importantly, domestic monitors were denied the opportunity to observe the counting of ballots in all but a few cases, which seriously undermines the transparency and fairness of any electoral process.

Another source of confusion was the fact that the location of polling stations was never publicly announced and only the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) seemed privy to this information as well as voter registration lists, facilitating thorough preparation and get-out-the-vote efforts. In many cases, it seemed as if the NDP were charged with administering the voting process at polling centers. NDP representatives, but no other parties, were prepared to fill out for often-illiterate voters a "Yes Mubarak" card containing their registration number which could then be used to gain access to the polling station, and when shown to the supervising judge, would help facilitate their vote. When asked about the appropriateness of these cards, one judge commented simply, "It makes it easy for us and for the voters."

Mubarak supporters, often arriving en masse in hired busses with signs, banners and loudspeakers, were a prominent presence inside and outside the polling stations. At some polling places, NDP supporters handed out raffle tickets offering a trip to Mecca, a new apartment, home furnishings or appliances in return for Mubarak votes.

The 1,800 Judges whom the PEC singled out and denied the opportunity to supervise the election, created their own monitoring force and will issue a report on their findings in the coming days. Final reports will also be issued by the Independent Committee for Election Monitoring and other civil society coalitions of domestic observers. Boutros Ghali, chairman of the National Council for Human Rights is also expected to announce his own assessment of the election process and domestic monitoring efforts.

Upon reviewing the findings of these reports and other lessons learned, the EDSN intends to aid Egyptian civil society, human rights advocates and activists to push for necessary legal and administrative reform in advance of the November parliamentary elections. It is also essential that the election administration is pressed—well ahead of time—to allow both domestic and international monitors full access to the casting and counting of ballots.

Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies

Secretariat, Egyptian Democracy Support Network