Declaration of Priorities and Mechanisms of Reform in the Arab World - The Cairo Institute for Human Rights, the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights and International Politics magazine

Cairo, 5-7 July 2004

The Cairo Institute for Human Rights, the Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights and International Politics magazine held a conference in Cairo from the 5th - 7th July on priorities and mechanisms of reform in the Arab world. The Conference was attended by some 100 participants from 15 Arab countries.
The Conference discussed international reform initiatives in the Arab world and what has been achieved by the three recently convened G8, EU - US and NATO international summits convened last month. It also considered the Alexandria Document and the "Second Independence" initiative, and in particular what came out of the Arab League Summit in relation to reform, the pretexts under which Arab governments refuse reform and Arab human rights associations' assessment of the results of the Summit. The Conference in addition discussed visions and priorities of political reform in 8 Arab countries; Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Jordan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Algeria and paid particular attention to the Moroccan experience.

The Conference drew the following conclusions:
1) Despite suspicion about some of the latent motives behind international reform initiatives in the Arab world, it should be noted that they contain a number of the most important reform demands contained in the reform programme of reformists, political movements and human rights groups. The start of reform dialogue was marked by the widening of reform visions contained in the G8 initiative to include civil society in the Arab world as an equal and essential partner with Arab governments in serious reform processes in every country.
There is no doubt that governments and civil society groups have a shared interest in countering religious and ethnic fundamentalism and the culture of violence, discrimination and hatred. The abuse of Islam by small minorities in the Arab and the Islamic world to justify acts of violence and terrorism and to found a religious and discriminatory state is exactly as has happened within Christianity and Judaism, where religious ideals are employed to spread violence and a culture of hatred and discrimination. The most important of the positive aspects of the international reform initiatives was their pushing Arab governments - who are indifferent to public opinion on reform in their countries - to recognise the importance of reform - even if the matter was restricted to dialogue orientated to reform in the international community. For the first time in the history of the Arab League the issue of reform and democracy imposed itself on the agenda. Equally the Egyptian and Yemeni Governments convened reform conferences in Alexandria (in March) and Sanaa (January) respectively.
2) Arab governments both collectively and individually carry the moral and political responsibility for the ugly reality that the international community has been forced to propose reform initiatives in the region due to governments' persistent rejection of internal political, legal and constitutional internal reform to counter corruption and poverty. Democratic and intellectual forces in the Arab world have continuously proposed such reform since the 1967 defeat within the framework of the national struggle for independence.
3) This collective responsibility for the Arab world's lagging behind with regard to political and constitutional reform was made worryingly obvious by the decisions issued by the Arab League Summit held in Tunisia. They provide fresh evidence that the majority of Arab Governments reject calls for reform regardless of the origin of this demand, whether it comes from inside or abroad. The Summit was satisfied to issue an eloquently composed statement of intent which was not only completely devoid of any practical obligations or time plan but which linked reform with a solution to the Palestinian problem. In spite of signing the statement, many Arab governments continued their suffocation of freedoms and harassment of human rights organisations and reformists both before and after the Summit.
4) The ending of the Israeli occupation of the occupied Arab lands and full recognition of the Palestinian peoples' rights are fundamental demands motivating political and constitutional reform in the Arab world and a moderating force on religious extremism and political violence in the Arab world. However the suffering of the Palestinian people cannot be used to hinder the reform programme or justify human rights violations.
5) Arab governments' desire to placate international society and its demands for reform explains the speedy convening of reform conferences by some governments. Civil society conferences are convened to mobilise public opinion and pressurise governments for reform. When conferences are sponsored by governments themselves they must surely result in a programme and detailed plan of action and time frame for the implementation of reform demands raised by political forces.

Reform scenarios
6) The peoples of the Arab world are in a difficult position for the following reasons:
- They doubt the seriousness and motives behind international reform initiatives.
- They realise that their governments will refuse reform because it constitutes a threat to their absolute power and the monopoly that they enjoy in managing internal affairs without ever being brought to account.
- They do not have the necessary power to pressurise governments to adopt a reform plan as a result of the disunity afflicting the Arab population on major issues.
7) In this context four theoretical-hypothetical paths for the process of reform stand out:
1. Reform imposed from abroad such as happened in Iraq. The present situation is a disappointment to even the most optimistic, even if we compare it with the brutal conditions preceding the occupation, and even if it is remembered that the barbarous former regime appears as a special case when compared with other authoritarian regimes in the Arab world. The Iraqi situation was an exceptional case that cannot be used as an example to be followed.
2. Revolution cannot be called reform. More importantly the Arab world lacks the factors necessary for revolution. There is no evidence of the existence of a democratic movement capable of realising its aims through a popular revolution or a civil-military alliance.
3. Reform from above on the lines of the Moroccan model of gradual reform - which is still ongoing despite some recent setbacks. This approach is founded on a base of agreement between the monarchy, main political parties and important civil society elements. It enjoins the political regime to acknowledge its previous crimes.
The number of Arab governments qualified to choose this scenario is extremely limited. There is no doubt that the choice of whether this path should be taken or not depends not only on the volition of the ruling regime, but also on the extent of civil society and political party dynamism in the country, and the nature of civil society relations with the state.
4. Civil society reform requires that civil society forces and political parties grow and reach a level whereby they are able to interact both with opposition and ruling political forces. This might encompass the penetration and influencing of ruling elites so that they take the path of reform.
Despite the fact that this scenario depends entirely on the nature of internal relations, the nature of the international society's relations with the ruling regime and the civil society will play a crucial role in determining to what extent the appropriate environment for progress exists.
There is of course not a huge divide separating the last three hypothetical scenarios, as the third could lead to the fourth, and the fourth could lead to the third and the second.
Demands for reform from within
8) The four hypothetical scenarios for reform from within require:
1. The existence of a firm desire within the ranks of the political and cultural elite for reform, and consensus about the absolute priorities which must be placed on the political reform agenda, even at the expense of other issues, no matter how important they might be.
2. That a creative harmonious solution be found to the relationship between religion and the state, without this solution disturbing the essence of the reform case or leading to the substitution of one authoritarian regime with another.
3. Agreement on the basic reforms necessary.
4. Desire by the ruling elite for reform, or at least their non-resort to violence to suppress the reform movement.

Priorities for reform
9) Outlining every political reform demand was not the aim of this Conference since this has already been comprehensively done in the Alexandria and "Second Independence" documents. The political, social and cultural differences between Arab countries suggest the existence of different priorities for each country. Concentration of specific priorities in demarcated time periods does of course not mean that the rest of the elements of a comprehensive reform programme will be disregarded.Conference discussions made clear that the foremost demand for political reform in countries with republican political systems was the exchange of power and the imposition of a time limit on presidential terms of office. Monarchies must be replaced by constitutional monarchies. The priority in Egypt is a presidential republic while the rule of law must take root in Syria. In Saudi Arabia religious institutional reform and the separation of religion from the state is the priority. Moreover, comprehensive constitutional reform and the application of the values of equality, citizenship and women's rights constitute a pivotal issue in all Arab Countries. The taking of risks on development and reform mechanisms in all Arab countries necessarily requires the selection of limited priorities. The concentration on these priorities contributes to the development of the power of this reform and the creation of the best environment for the most creative relations between the ruling elite and international society. It will also eventually lead to fundamental amendment of the prevailing political equation.
Discussions identified a number of shared priorities for reform:
i. Freedom of obtaining information and its circulation.
ii. Freedom of establishing and administering political parties, trade unions and NGO's.
iii. Freedom of expression, in particular the rights to assembly and meeting. Prisoners of conscience must be given their freedom.
iv. Lifting of states of emergency as soon as possible, annulment of emergency and exceptional laws.

Mechanisms for reform
10) The discussion on reform mechanisms drew the following proposals:
1. On the local level: creation of a productive organisational framework for reform forces in every country. This must be of a harmonious and flexible character, and must include political parties, civil society institutions and those individuals who agree on a basic reform programme. This framework could include elements from ruling regimes where this is possible.
2. On the regional level: creation of a regional platform in the Arab world for dialogue and exchange of experiences between reform forces from political parties, civil society institutions and individual.
3. On the international level: development of the suggested platform for dialogue between the international community and Arab governments seeking reform. The inclusion of civil society institutions as a part of this dialogue will create an equilateral triangle.
4. Supporting mechanisms:
A civil society observatory to monitor and measure changes and developments in reform in the Arab world. -Preparation of a comprehensive document on reform initiatives proposed by democratic forces in the Arab world since the June 1967 defeat to establish the setbacks and rejections that these proposals and demands have received for years since they began to be put forward. This will also allow the document to be a complete reference work for political forces and civil society in the preparation of the new reform programme.
The results of the last Arab League summit have made us even more convinced that reform is the shared interest of all Arab people. This Conference calls all civil society forces from local associations, trade unions, political parties, think tanks and other democratic associations to build and widen networks and adopt shared action plans to consolidate the struggle for democracy, good governance, human rights and establish contacts with social and mass movements.