APRIL 05 NEWSLETTER
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Civil Society

Egypt’s Fig Leaf of Human Rights

by Naiem A. Sherbiny

From the start, skeptics in Egypt and abroad dismissed the establishment of the Higher Council on Human Rights (HCHR) as a fig leaf - an attempt to put a decent façade on an ugly reality. At issue was the credibility of the Mubarak regime in political circles at home and abroad. Whether the regime was well intentioned or master of deception is irrelevant. What is relevant is the regime’s poor track record on basic human rights of Egyptians. This has been documented by international organizations for the last 20-some years: continued Emergency Laws since Mubarak took power; unchecked powers of state security agents; arbitrary incarceration of ‘suspected figures’; absence of due process to reign in political opposition; widespread torture in political prisons; quadrupling the number of political prisoners; etc. This oppressive state existed prior to 2003 when the HCHR was established, and continues unabated today. It could continue through 2010 if Mubarak were elected for a fifth term. So what good did the creation of the Council serve?

In the name of combating terrorism, the regime’s heavy handedness stagnated the political life in Egypt and called it stability. Egypt’s Western allies welcomed political stability at any price in the chaotic Middle East, and rewarded Mubarak with substantial financial, economic, and military support. To that extent, the interest of Egypt and its allies converged. However, the flip side to the coin of fake stability caused a divergence in interest with Egypt’s allies: September 11, 2001.

That historic event and its aftermath demonstrated to international public opinion that the oppressive environment promoted by Mubarak (and his equally dictatorial predecessors) had left deep scars in Egypt’s body politic: rendering the majority apathetic and leaving the pro-active minority with little choice: political violence or migration. As fate would have it, many of those imprisoned for political activism left Egypt after serving, and they tended to participate in large numbers in terrorist networks. After September 11th the West began to connect the dots between Mubarak’s oppression and the widespread terror networks. It turns out that Egypt’s most notorious export was none other than international terrorism. That is when the interest of Egypt and Western allies diverged. The West became stern with Mubarak to get his own house in order. Is it any surprise that the HCHR was created after September 11th?


Without specific measures in place to ensure at least two guarantees, the HCHR would be ‘toothless’ and continue to be the shameless fig leaf of the regime. First, is the autonomy of the Council in personnel appointments and reporting, both of which should intimately be linked to Egypt’s supreme court, not to the presidency. Second, violations to basic human rights, especially by security agencies, should be punishable by law. Mubarak’s fifth term would result in neither.

 

Civil Society
 
 

 
 
   
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