ICDS Political and Religious Reform Conference

To commemorate the second anniversary of its reopening, the Ibn Khadlun Center for Development Studies held its Annual Conference on Political and Religious Reform in the Arab World on June 30th, 2005. The conference was attended by over 120 intellectuals and political activists from Egypt, the Arab region, and the rest of the world.

In the first sessions of the conference, the discussions centered on the new climate of activism and reform initiatives in Egypt. While all participants agreed that Egypt is undergoing an unprecedented level of public opposition to the status quo, opinions diverged on the extent and effectiveness of this activism and its potential in freeing Egypt from its current political and economic stagnation.

The discussions on political reform addressed three main issues: the accumulation of obstacles after decades of repression; the approaches needed to propel reform; and the role of civil society actors and international players in supporting the present efforts to democratize.

Speakers at the conference were in agreement regarding the many impediments preventing the establishment and consolidation of a truly democratic and representative system of governance. Over fifty years of repression and institutionalized corruption created a passive and politically unaware population, an inefficient public sector, weak political parties, a decapitated media, and a fragmented civil society?all serious deficiencies which unless remedied will make impossible a peaceful and efficient transition to democracy. To add to an already dire situation, the stagnating economy since the late 1990s has led to widespread unemployment, poverty and inequality?all symptoms of the kind of socio-economic malaise which provides a fertile soil for the growth of Islamic extremism.

While there was unanimity regarding the diagnosis, participants differed as to the optimum path to a cure. All the same, the approach endorsed by most reform forces in Egypt such as opposition political parties and the Kefaya movement, is to focus primarily on specific demands that would change and open up the political system, rather than push for the adoption of grand comprehensive reform schemes. Major demands include, an abolition of the emergency law; a halt to the security forces' interference in public life; genuine separation of power between the three branches of government; free and fair elections supervised from start to finish by the judiciary; and a constitutional amendment that would abolish all repressive laws and bylaws such as the 1996 Press Law, the 1977 Political Parties Law, and the 2002 NGO Law. The second approach, endorsed by a minority of participants at the conference, urged that cultural reform ought to precede any effort at political reform, if the latter is to stand a chance of succeeding. Advocates of this trend, supported by many intellectuals and religious reformers in Egypt, believe that ossified and backward cultural and religious beliefs present the main obstacles to democratization. Consequently, proponents of this approach maintain that the primary goals for a successful democratic transition should be raising public awareness and religious and educational reforms. Bahai Eddin Hassan, Chairman of the Cairo Institute of Human Rights Studies, argued that while the goals of these two approaches are highly desirable, they will remain largely unsuccessful as long as power relations within society remain unchanged. Hence, he proposed an alternative third approach that would focus on altering relations of power through the creation of a unified front comprising civil society organizations and opposition parties, which could constitute a countervailing force to that of the state. The new front, once formed, will no doubt also benefit from the positive aspects of international pressure and reform initiatives. Needless to say efforts to change Egypt's repressive laws and bylaws and to educate the public on the meaning of and need for democracy also have a capacity to alter relations of power. It is clear that all these approaches are interdependent and feed into each other. But resources are limited; hence a coordinated strategy is required. The attainment of this strategy is one of the most serious challenges facing pro-democracy activists. Or is this kind of coordinating a needless, as well as an unfeasible strategy?

The role of Western powers in democratization efforts in the Arab region remained among the most controversial topics addressed at the conference. The speeches of representatives from the American National Endowment for Democracy and the British Westminster Foundation for Democracy, both organizations working for the promotion of democracy worldwide, indicated that the establishment of democracy in the Arab world and particularly in Egypt has become a priority in the West. Both speakers emphasized that democratization efforts need to be driven domestically in order to be successful and that the West's role remains merely to encourage, strengthen and support local efforts.

Many in the Arab world, however, remain skeptical regarding the intentions of the West and opposed to all forms of external help which they look upon as interference. Many participants referred to the West's and particularly the US's longtime support of autocratic Arab regimes of human rights abuses conducted in the name of the war on terror, its occupation of Iraq, and its unconditional support of Israel as proof of Western double-standards. In this vision, the West is perceived to be exclusively driven by its own interests, hence no longer a legitimate player in the future of the Arab world. Other participants of the conference have, however, acknowledged the possibility of a positive Western role in support of democratization efforts of the people of the Middle East. Several participants argued that the firm stand taken by the US vis à vis dictatorial Arab regimes has already provided a margin of freedom for civil society and opposition forces within the Middle East and has helped break the barrier of fear? increasingly leading to a level of loud and open local criticism of the incumbent regimes. Yet, even those calling for Western support maintain that such involvement should be conditional, i.e. local forces should determine priorities and remain in the driver's seat. Participants argued that dialogue among governmental and non-governmental as well as local and international bodies is integral to achieving a peaceful process of reform. The dialogue would enable negotiation between Western powers who possess the strength to apply positive inducements (more favorable terms of trade, more aid) and negative incentives (withholding aid, sanctions) to pressure regimes unwilling to democratize and the local opposition which for the reasons mentioned above, have little comparable power.

Other extremely contentious issues ?which received the most negative press in Egypt? were addressed at the Religious Reform sessions. Islamic scholars Gamal El-Banna and Mohamed Shahrour, emphasized the need for a re-interpretive effort, ijdihad, drawn from a sole source ?the holy Quran? in order to understand the true values of Islam within the context of the modern world and its international ethos of human rights. The two speakers argued that the evolution of Islam has stopped at the four traditional schools of Sunni Islam, established over a thousand years ago. As a consequence, Muslims are still governed by archaic and rigid medieval rules, inadequate for meeting challenges and circumstances of modern life. The two speakers maintained that Islamic traditions and jurisprudence should be viewed as contextual teachings, rather than eternal rules to govern Muslims. They argued that religious institutions, such as Al-Azhar, deviate from one of the most important principles of Islam when they insist on having a monopoly of Islamic doctrine, denying the right of Muslims to use their reason to interpret and apply Islamic values to meet present day challenges. To demonstrate the precedence given to reason over tradition in Islam, Mr. Banna drew on examples from the history of the four rightful caliphs, who abrogated prophetic teachings in order to meet novel circumstances. According to the speakers, Al-Azhar also remains a breeding ground for intolerance despite the fact that the Quran clearly mandates freedom of belief and religion. The underlying thrust of these two speakers clearly supports the proposition that comprehensive reform can only occur after a cultural and religious reformation since the current ideology, interpretation and practice of Islam are the major obstacles to progress for in their essence they are opposed to democracy and thus help create passive citizens unwilling to challenge or even question authority.

Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim closed the conference on an encouraging note, urging all pro-democracy activists not to despair since a transition to democracy is by nature a long, difficult road with each step, however miniscule, bringing us closer to the final destination.