Abstract from the Introduction to
ICDS's 2004 Annual Report
on Civil Society & Democratization in the Arab World

By Moheb Zaki

The defining feature of all Arab regimes is authoritarianism, in which an individual (monarch, president or sultan) dominates the political arena while allowing a margin of freedom?defined as the degree of liberalization ? within civil society which might be small or relatively large.
While no doubt liberalization improves the quality of life, and might be the handmaiden of democracy, the two concepts are quite different. Though both are desirable, and are indeed twin features of genuinely democratic regimes, yet they should not be conflated.
Monarchs who wield executive power?not to mention also at least some legislative powers, as all Arab monarchs do?may go a long way towards liberalizing their country but they can never establish a democracy. A first basic step to establish a democracy must entail restricting executive power, especially that of the monarch or president and the possibility of replacing the government, including the supreme executive?i.e. in this case, the King. It also involves the necessity of placing supreme power in the hands of the people and their representatives. These are conditions that the present Arab monarchs and presidents cannot of course contemplate. In short, democracy is based on certain types of institutions and political practices that permit constitutional change of government via popular elections.
And thus all that can be said, at present, of Arab rulers who liberalize is that at best they are enlightened autocrats. Ironically, the regimes of Arab republics were found to be mostly far less liberal than those of the absolute monarchies.

The pressing issue with such regimes is whether the liberal steps they take do in fact move them towards a transition to durable stable democratic forms of rule, or are they merely a tactical retreat under internal and/or international pressures which can be reversed once the pressures are lifted, or once the liberal opening proves ineffective in dealing with the intractable problems they face.

The second basic step to the establishment of democracy is that the norm should be the rule of well defined law, not rule by laws open to arbitrary interpretation by the rulers. To speak of constitutional guarantees in the presence of conditional clauses­?as in the case of all Arab constitutions­?which grant broad political freedoms and civil rights then qualify them with vague restrictive phrases?that are always subject to the interpretation of the ruler?like "provided they don’t violate generally accepted moral or societal values" is to nullify all guarantees, and perpetuate authoritarian rule.

Most Arab countries have been living in a state of crisis, for at least the last two decades, under authoritarian regimes that precluded any real participation by the people. But in the last three years or so, the Arab world is witnessing the beginnings of a sea change, characterized by an increasing effort at introspection to determine the causes of their malaise. The preponderance of the evidence clearly indicates that the fundamental cause of the Arab predicament is the failure to establish the institutions of a genuine liberal democracy.

While all reform must spring in the first instance from the efforts of the people of each Arab country and be motivated by their determined will to strive and sacrifice in order to force the change on their reluctant rulers, yet the developed democracies of America and Europe have also a vital role to play if local efforts are to succeed: that of providing an enabling international environment that would support and enhance the local efforts. Such external support needs to be carefully measured. Direct overt intervention will be counterproductive, for not only will it be resented by the people, but it will also undermine the efforts of the pro-democratic elements in society who will be branded as mere agents promoting a Western agenda.

Of equal importance is that the West must maintain a coherent and consistent set of policies towards the Arab countries they wish to help democratize. These policies must strike the proper balance between the two important?and interdependent?goals of stability and the mobilization of civil society to effect democratic reform. Until quite recently the West has favored the first goal to the detriment of the second, with the consequence that many in the Arab world have tended to discount, and to distrust, the democratic rhetoric of the West as merely a vehicle for cynically pursuing its own interests which involve supporting and maintaining the autocratic regimes that have oppressed them for decades.
Of late, however, the West led by the United States has tended to correct this imbalance, using both positive and negative incentives to urge Arab governments to undertake meaningful political reform.
No longer are the worn-out excuses of autocratic regimes to delay reform indefinitely acceptable. The claim of exceptionalism of each Arab society, that was used to justify undertaking reforms at a glacial pace, or suspending all reform by raising fears of the bogeyman of Islamist fundamentalists coming to power in the wake of significant democratic openings are rejected by both domestic opposition forces and the democratic West.

There can be no doubt that the current U.S. strong support of democracy and its close monitoring of the governments of the region with respect to democratization and respect for individual freedoms has been a major cause for the present vigorous activism and outspoken demands for radical democratic reform within many Arab societies. The external pressure and the close scrutiny of the behavior of Arab governments by the West has provided for pro-democratic activists?although unacknowledged by them?what may be called a “safety net.” They now know, albeit often unconsciously, that their dictatorial governments can no longer afford to defy the democratic international community and brazenly suppress their people ruthlessly. This new reality has pervaded the consciousness of opposition forces calling for democracy, and thus helped break down the barrier of fear that has long kept them subdued in the face of outrageously dictatorial regimes.

An impediment that prevents domestic democratic forces from full utilization of Western pressures on Arab governments to effect reform is America’s total support of Israel in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This has led to the perception among many in the Arab world that the conflict is in essence between Muslims and a largely hostile Christian-Jewish West. This has driven a wedge between large segments of the Arab Muslim people and the West, and has caste doubt on the credibility of the West’s, particularly America’s, vehement proclamations of its dedication to the goal of democracy in the Arab world. Unfortunately, this total U.S. bias in favor of Israel has played into the hands of the Islamists who have used this as a rallying cause against the West and its motives in the region. Worse still, the plight of the Palestinians, coupled with the humiliating developmental failures of the Arab regimes, fuel the recruitment of militant Islamic jihadists.
While the Palestinian problem does not in any way justify the delaying of democracy in the Arab countries, as many of its rulers have tried to do, yet no doubt the settlement of this festering problem for more than three quarters of a century will go a long way to stemming an important source of anti-Western and anti-democratic feelings in the Arab world.
Such a settlement will open the door for America and Europe to play a vitally effective role in the battle for the hearts and minds of the Arab people in the interest of democracy.