Political Reform in Egypt

Shortcomings of the Proposed Laws Governing the Electoral Process

On April 16th 2005, the People's Assembly passed a law allowing direct and competitive presidential elections, which it then sent to the Supreme Constitutional Court for final review. On the same day, President Husni Mubarak sent Parliament four new bills ostensibly designed to reform political rights and the electoral process in Egypt. Public officials announced that the People's Assembly must come to final decisions regarding the four proposed laws by June 23rd. The laws concern political rights, political parties, and the by-laws of the People's Assembly and the Shura Council (upper house of parliament). The following analysis aims to direct the attention of all stakeholders in Egypt's political future to some of the most serious limitations of the proposed laws.

Abolition of Emergency Laws? the Real Guarantee to a Free and Fair Electoral Process

The new law that now allows direct presidential elections gives no indication that the state of emergency will be lifted during the electoral campaigning phases. The persistence of emergency law seriously detracts from the credibility of the forthcoming elections since it allows the interference of security forces in all aspects of political life in Egypt. This creates a highly restrictive environment totally inimical to a free electoral campaign. Not only are peaceful demonstrations and rallies prohibited but opposition political forces are harassed and intimidated by police questioning and arrests. Among the latest victims of arbitrary arrests are Mr. Admed Saad and Dr. Mohamed Shakik, both members of the opposition Kifaya movement. While the proposed political rights law assigns oversight of the electoral campaigning process to the Higher Electoral Committee in order to ensure that all candidates have equal rights and opportunities in terms of access to the media and freedom to conduct their electoral campaigns, the persistence of the emergency law renders such stipulations meaningless.

Limitations to Political Party Development

The new political parties bill, far from reforming the notorious present law , is in fact a step backward. The Administrative Political Parties Council that sanctions the licensing of new parties is still headed by members of the ruling party. The conditions for licensing a new party remain unchanged offering the council wide discretionary powers. Furthermore, Article 8 of the proposed new law allows the Administrative Political Parties Council to interfere in the internal affairs of parties by giving the Council the authority to monitor whether a party's activities are in line with "national democratic standards and laws" and "preserve national unity". Violations of these vague edicts could lead to withdrawal of the party's license. The most serious regressive step, however, is that under the current law parties could appeal the Council's decision to the Supreme Administrative Court, which in several past cases ruled against the Council. To circumvent such a contingency, the new bill allows the government to appoint a number of administrators?equal to the number of judges of the Court? to sit on the bench and decide the case.

No Equal Opportunities for Presidential Candidates

The proposed laws do not treat citizens equally for they set different criteria for candidates depending on whether they are independents or political party leaders. While recognized political party leaders have the right to present their candidacy for the presidency in the upcoming 2005 elections without endorsement of any kind, independent candidates must receive prior approval of at least 250 officials from the National Assembly, the Shura Council and municipal councils—all overwhelmingly dominated by National Democratic Party members.

Electoral Procedures

Higher Committee of the Electoral Process

While the proposed law on political rights makes the Higher Committee of the Electoral Process the ultimate authority in the entire electoral process, and provides it with complete independence from the executive branch both financially and administratively, the composition of the board virtually renders the Committee an extension of the executive branch. Ignoring demands from the opposition and the Judges' Club to create an electoral committee composed solely of elected judges, the proposed law allows the executive to determine the members of the Committee. The new bill makes the Minister of Justice head of the Committee, which is composed of three judges selected by the appointed Supreme Judicial Council?which itself is selected by the government? six public figures selected by the NDP-dominated parliament, and a representative from the Ministry of Interior. Given the legal requirement of eight votes for any decision of the committee to come into effect and the regime's decision-making power in selecting the composition of the board, it is unlikely that the Committee will truly be an independent body free from the regime's influence.

The proposed laws have also ignored calls by the Judges' Club to conduct the elections in three separate phases to allow complete judicial supervision. The large number of electoral polling stations throughout the country's governorates (54,000) simply renders judicial presence in all stations unfeasible since there are only 11,700 Egyptian judges.

Local and International Electoral Monitoring:

None of the proposed laws address the issue of electoral monitoring?whether local or international?an element that would supplement the judicial supervision of the electoral process and increase the legitimacy of the elections. On the other hand, the proposed laws include vaguely worded stipulations regarding punishment of any individual who interferes with, influences or obstructs the electoral process in any way?stipulations that could be manipulated to block or hinder electoral observers.