An Unlikely Alliance: The Muslim Brotherhood and the National Democratic Party

By Saad Eddin Ibrahmin

The recent parliamentary elections brought several surprises. First are the outstanding gains in seats made by the Muslim Brotherhood in the first two rounds. Second is the fact that the government allowed the brotherhood to run under their traditional Islamic slogan, “Islam is the solution,” something which had never been tolerated in past elections. The two occurrences, taken together, elicit suspicions of a potential covert deal between the government and the Brotherhood.

The Brotherhood indeed made a remarkable performance in the parliamentary elections, during which they secured 76 seats in the first two rounds and an additional 12 in the last. No quasiauthoritarian regime would be forced to allow an officially banned group to control 20% of the parliament against its wishes. Of further note is the fact that in the run-up to the elections, for the first time in decades, there were no Muslim Brotherhood members in jail.

But why would the government so accommodate the Muslim Brotherhood? One reason is that it limits their own security concerns. Though the elections were marred by significant violent incidents and hundreds of arrests, the situation would have been much worse had the Brotherhood organized in response to widespread repressions large national demonstrations, something which they are quite capable of doing. Moreover, given the level of international interest in these elections, permitting greater tolerance of the MB enhances the regime's democratic image abroad. And finally, granting the Muslim Brotherhood some limited success further bolsters the regime's case for adopting a course of gradual l iberalization; not only does gradual democratization appear possible, but it appears increasingly desirable in the eyes of theWest.

Certain evidence also suggests that Muslim Brotherhood sought to minimize their confrontation with the regime. They tempered their overt criticism of in the lead-up to the elections and they declined to join other opposition parties in public demonstrations against the regime. Most importantly, the Brotherhood's limited contestation of the parliament running only 150 candidates when they could have fielded many more is further evidence that they did not seek to mount a comprehensive challenge to the NDP.

The Brotherhood, because they avoided largescale pre-emptive government repression, stood to gain a platform from which to officially present their position in the national discourse. Though unable to be decisive in formulating policy while in control of only 25% of parliamentary seats, their significant weight in the legislature will give them the opportunity to raise relevant concerns regarding the role of Islam in education, politics, economics and society in a setting other than the mosque.

Despite numerous examples of and ample motivation for possible collusion between the two groups, their implicit policy of non-confrontation has not survived the duration of the parliamentary elections. For one, supporters on both sides, mainly motivated by ideology and the passion of competition rather the directives of their most senior leaders, have clashed in numerous provinces. But also, the use of central security police to arrest hundreds of Brotherhood supporters throughout Egypt and the large-scale efforts to disenfranchise voters in the last round suggest that the repressive actions originated at the higher levels of the regime.

But why would the NDP ally with the Brotherhood in the first round, allowing them so many seats from Cairo (traditionally their weakest region)? It would have made more sense for the Brotherhood to limit their gains in the first round in exchange for greater freedoms in the latter two. Since this did not happen, it appears that the best possible explanation is that an understanding between the two entities existed and these arrests and confrontations have been inevitable collateral damage in the context of the elections' tense environment.

Short-term cooperation has effectively broken down and long-term cooperation, at first glance, might seem unlikely given the Brotherhood's goal of promoting a greater Islamic identity in Egyptian politics. However, it should come as little surprise if the Brotherhood becomes co-opted by the system, moderates its position and is forced to make significant policy compromises. As unlikely as this scenario may seem, it is often said that democratic politics is a moderating force, and Egypt will probably not end up being the exception to the rule.