NOVEMBER 05 Newsletter

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Civil Society

ICEM Reports: Progressive Deterioration of Election Process

The Independent Committee for Election Monitoring, a coalition of 16 NGOs led by Ibn Khaldun, recruited, trained and deployed a total of 5,000 observers in an effort to provide for the integrity and credibility of the Parliamentary Elections. Due to the significant and unanticipated inroads made by the Muslim Brotherhood over the course of the election rounds, ICEM reports have a shown a steady deterioration in the electoral standards being applied. This deterioration was evidenced in the following realms:

Voter Turnout

One of the most important accomplishments of ICEM has been to collect and publish data estimates on voter turn-out before the government can compile its own numbers with the result that the government has been forced to reduce its own margins of exaggeration. The estimates for the six election days (three phases and their respective runoffs) were as follows: 34%, 25%, 17%, 18%, 18%, and 8%. ICEM believes that the dramatic drop in voter turn-out is largely due to the escalation of violence as well as the organized attempts to prevent citizens from casting their votes. This situation was especially grave in the last run-off phase where police forces intervened massively to prevent voters from approaching the polling places and responded to subsequent protests with excessive and deadly force.

Obstruction of Monitoring Activities

ICEM monitors often met with resistance as they tried to perform their tasks. Perhaps most critically, observers were never massively granted access to observe the counting of the votes. Also, in spite of an explicit instruction from the Minister of Justice stating that all should be separately announced, this was never implemented in the vast majority of the centers and the counting continued to be conducted in a chaotic and uncontrolled environment.As far as ICEM is concerned, this has truly undermined a critical component of the monitoring operation which sought to establish the credibility of the electoral process. And, more generally speaking, as the elections wore on, ICEM observAers faced an increasing number of restrictions placed on their activity; fewer and fewer observers as well as candidate poll-watchers were allowed to monitor the opening and voting procedures as well.Without adequate access to the voting process in its entirety, it becomes exceedingly difficult to legitimize the results. Additionally, dozens of observers were also specifically targeted: verbally threatened, physically beaten, arrested, detained, expelled from the premises and had their official accreditations confiscated. ICEM condemns in the strongest possible terms these unlawful acts perpetrated against its observers which violate not only the court ruling but also their human rights. Furthermore, ICEM considers that the government's decision to even allow domestic monitoring has been voided of all practical significance in the wake of the actions taken by the authorities who used every possible means to obstruct meaningful monitoring activities.

Voting Violations and Irregularities

Numerous counts of voting fraud and irregularities have been documented. Among these: Voter-intimidation, vote-buying, multiple voting, group-voting, illegal campaigning, ballot-stuffing, box-switching, counting irregularities, inaccurate voter lists, and polling center closings. (For full ICEM report www.ndi.org). In many of these instances, enough detailed information was collected about the incidents to make future investigations possible.

Violations

ICEM witnessed a dramatic increase in the level of violence which began in earnest in the second round, after the surprise of the Muslim Brotherhood's stronger-than-expected showing. Though several kidnappings, beatings, and reports of shootings occurred on the first day of the elections, these types of incidents greatly multiplied thereafter. Furthermore, beginning in the second round, ICEM began to witness the appearance of well-organized and systematic violence; traveling groups of thugs went from polling station to polling statAion intimidating voters and attacking crowds. Furthermore, the attitudes of the security forces played a key role in determining the extent to which the violence spread. In the first round of the elections, the police forces behaved in a more or less neutral fashion and then subsequently changed their posture and began to interfere in a more partisan manner. In Alexandria, during the second round, there were numerous hospitalizations, two fatalities, and a candidate was stabbed in the neck. Though all sides ruling party, opposition and independent candidate supporters were involved, the overarching trend revealed that it was mainly NDP orchestrated groups that were responsible for the planned violent activity. The most violent day, however, occurred on the December 7, the last day of the elections. There were at least eight fatalities, dozens were hospitalized, and scores more injured. These events in particular happened as large crowds formed outside of the polling centers to protest the fact that they were not allowed to vote. Police then employed force, tear gas and rubber bullets, in efforts to disperse the crowds.

Disenfranchisement

After the initial success of the Muslim Brotherhood in winning seats in the first round, ICEM also witnessed a sharp increase in the number of people prevented from entering the polling centers. This happened as a result of several events: heavy security force presence effectively cordoning off the area; judges not keeping the polling centers open during the full, scheduled hours of the election; violent clashes occurring outside the premises; and, voters being denied entry on an individual basis, according to whether or not their appearance suggested Muslim Brotherhood loyalties. In some cases even, entire villages were closed off and prevented from voting. 

Civil Society
 
 

 
 
   
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