Al Wasat and the Destiny of Moderate Islamists in Egypt

By Michael Fournie

In the wake of September 11th and the Iraq war, American and Western attention has focused on remaking a democratic Middle East. However, apprehensions about the compatibility of Islam with democracy as well as the role and intentions of Islamists have occupied much of the Western discourse on the future of democracy in the region. Arab dictators, who often have friendly relations with the West, have benefited from peddling the fear that Islamists are a radical opposition force that would fare well in polls and then be hostile to Western regimes.

The picture on the ground, however, is quite different and far more complex. An Islamist, as defined by Graham Fuller is, "anyone who believes that the Koran and the Hadith contain important principles about Muslim governance and society, and who tries to implement these principles in some way." This definition allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the reality that Islamists range from the peaceful and moderate to violent radicals or fundamentalists such as Al Qaeda. Western policy makers are slowly awakening to the realization that, from their policy perspective, not all Islamists are bad. This has created a growing interest in engaging Islamists, who in many countries like Egypt; enjoy by far the most popular support as an appositional force to the existing regime. The difficulty continues to be deciding which Islamists are moderate and thus should be engaged in dialogue, and which Islamists are to be feared as a threat to peaceful relations with the West, especially while even the most moderate of Islamists, such as Egypt'sWasat party, are denied an official role.

In Egypt, the late twentieth century witnessed a growing and public acceptance of democratic principles on the part of Islamists. This embrace has been largely pragmatic and has eschewed theoretical debates about the limits of the people's sovereignty to legislate or whether slam is at all compatible with democracy. Islamists were the first to remind the Egyptian population that the two most fundamental tenets of their religion are justice and equality, and that a tyrannical ruler whose policies do little to support these Islamic principles should be replaced violently if necessary. Violent overthrow, however, has long proven ineffectual and in most cases suicidal. Having learned from their predecessors, Egyptian Islamists of nearly all shades now espouse democratic means. This newborn and pragmatic support of democracy stems from the Islamists' conviction that they would be the foremost beneficiaries of free and fair elections.

To date, however, all Islamists in Egypt, and most notably the Muslim Brotherhood, have been denied the opportunity to play the political game as officially recognized parties. The Brotherhood, even though it is content to remain a social movement, has massive grassroots appeal and functions as strong oppositional force to the regime. In any case, its large, unwieldy nature and hierarchical structure, where power resides in the hands of a few aging hardliners, would make the pragmatic functions and the necessary compromises of a registered political party next to impossible.

In 1996, however; the younger generation of Muslim Brothers led by Abu 'Ala Madi demonstrated their desire to become more than a religious movement and play politics within the rules of the Egyptian political game. They have shown an affinity for the values of democracy and human rights derived in a large part from the fact that these second tier moderates of the Muslim Brotherhood were the primary victims of arbitrary authoritarian rule and extralegal imprisonments. In 1996,Abu 'Ala Madi,Assam Sultan and others first put forth a party platform and applied for legal recognition from the Political Parties Committee (PPC) of the Shura Council.

The platform of Al Wasat, meaning "The Center," argues for democratic reforms separation of powers, a balanced relation with the United States, and human rights including women's rights and the inclusion of Coptic Christians in its vision. AlWasat envisions a democratically and economically modern state based on the cultural values of Islam, not on Islamic theology. While they accept the secondamendment of the Egyptian constitution which states that no law can contradict the Islamic Shari'a, theWasatbelieves that the respect for and gradual implementation of Shari'a must be based on Ijtihad, or individualinterpretation through human reasoning. Moreover,Abu 'Ala Madi has argued for an interpretation that doesnot marginalize women and non-Muslims. In many ways, theWasat most closely resembles the moderate and currently ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) inTurkey.

In spite of what appears to be a moderate platform, theWasat's application for party recognition has twice been rejected by the PPC on the grounds of Sadat's Law 40/1977, which states that any new political
party must have at least 50 founding members and its program must significantly distinguish it from existing political parties. After being rejected for the first time in 1996, the internal composition of the Wasat was restructured to include fewer Muslim Brothers among its members, many of whom defected back the brotherhood. In 1996, nearly 85% of the founders were Brothers. Whereas, by 1998 only 24 of the new 93 founding members were Muslim Brothers, 19 were women and 3 were Christian. In fact, Rafiq Habib, a prominent Protestant thinker, still holds one of the five leadership council positions in theWasat.

While some still fear that the Wasat remains simply an extension of the Brotherhood, this restructuring can be seen as a formal break with that latter organization, which incidentally opposes Wasat recognition as a party from fear that their eagerness to make Islam compatible with modern notions would in effect undermine and contaminate the pure Islamic message. From the Wasat perspective, however, theBrotherhood lacks understanding of the sophistication of Egyptian culture as well as the ability to advance the interest of the Islamic movement in the modern world. The Wasat's second attempt to seek official recognition in 1998 was also rejected.

Recently, a third attempt at legal recognition was again initially rejected on the grounds that it added nothing new, but a legal appeal before the administrative court merits optimism for a favorable outcome.A ruling on the matter was expected by October 1, 2005, but that decision was delayed until Dec. 3, 2005 at the government's behest. Government lawyers have claimed that they need more time to review a 10-page report written by legal experts last June. There is no question that the government is dragging its feet in order to at least prevent theWasat from competing in November's parliamentary elections.

From the perspective of the Egyptian regime, acceptance of theWasat party may be a calculated risk which they are ready to take. If the Wasat is recognized, then the government would have grounds for not allowing any other parties with a religious tinge to their platform and they might take the wind out of the Brotherhood's sails, by offeringAmoderate and progressive Islamic alternative. Moreover, there is reason to believe that the Wasat may not be religious enough to garner mass support among Egypt's devout Muslim population. This, however, remains to be seen.

There can be no doubt that the inclusion of moderate Islamists in the Egyptian political process is a necessary and a long over due realization. Any political dialogue in the Arab world which excludes the Islamists would be one sided and thus meaningless. Furthermore, if Islamists come to power in the Arab world it would be much preferable, and ensure continued respect of democratic principles, if they do so within the bounds of a democratic game as was the case inTurkey. This is the only way to avoid the pitfalls of Iran, Sudan andAfghanistan where Islamists gained power by revolution, military coup and civil war.