Civil Society

Corruption and Incompetence: 
Persistent Problems of Confessional Democracies

By Saad Abi-Hamad

The horrific prospect of civil war among the various Iraqi sects has sparked discussion in some quarters over the prospect of implementing a system of confessional democracy in the turbulent Arab state.  In light of the categorical dismissals of a federal system from strong elements within the country, a system of confessional democracy (formal or informal) may become the only practical solution, should confessional or tribal associations prove stronger than national identification in Iraq.  Whilst confessional democracy may be practical, it is a system that contains inherent advantages and flaws that merit attention.

In a confessional democracy, political seats and appointments are distributed among the different confessional groups in the country, based on demographic and social calculations.  These same calculations are used in order to apportion public sector employment among those same groups.  Yet, the confessional system suffers acutely from the problem of patronage and incompetence.  That is not to say that patronage is not a common feature of all sorts of democratic systems, but in a confessional democracy the removal of incompetent appointees is all but impossible.  This can be appreciated very clearly in the Lebanese political system, a prominent example of this sort of political arrangement.

The Lebanese political system in its current state can best be likened to a three-headed Hydra.  The President is usually Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister Sunni, and the Head of Parliament a Shi’ite.   Each of those major sects, as well as several other smaller ones, have a certain number of governmental posts allocated to them, in addition to a certain quota of the jobs in the public sector. This allocation program was originally conceived in order to insure that all sects were fairly represented throughout the government. However, due to unchecked abuses to the program these jobs have become a means through which the President, PM, and Head of Parliament, can create a patron-client network.  Thus, appointment to the public sector has become based on political backing rather than merit.  Not surprisingly, this has lead to the appointment of a fair share of incompetents and crooks.

The system described above is very resistant to any sort of reform.  Should any of the three heads of the different branches of the government attempt a program of reform, he would be limited only to reviewing the appointees from his own sect.  A more conclusive review of all appointments would lead to direct confrontation with the other two branches of government, leaving him exposed to accusations of sectarianism, however justified and even-handed his reforms might have been.  Even the judiciary has proven incapable of tackling these issues, as its independence in this sort of system is questionable at best.

The situation in Lebanon is farther exacerbated by the constant demand from the leading politicians for the creation of yet more public sector jobs, through which they can expand their client lists.  This is often done irrespective of the fiscal disadvantages accrued by the state. The ultimate result then, is an overly bloated public sector; half of which specializes almost exclusively in generating useless paperwork and slowing down simple transactions.  All of this is of course carried out at exorbitant cost to the treasury, and the tax paying public.

It must be re-iterated that the system of confessional democracy could in some cases represent the only practical solution to addressing the concerns and phobias of a nation comprised of different sectarian groupings.  However the pitfalls of this system have been exemplified in Lebanon, illustrating that the system must not be allowed to interfere with the proper staffing of the public sector; political influence must be removed from the equation all together.  Should Iraq take this path, a system in which the applicants’ personal information is not included on applications could help safeguard against similar preferential hiring.  This would bring about the undoubtedly preferable scenario where applicants would be chosen solely on the basis of their education and experience, rather than religion or political affiliation. This would certainly not guarantee the proper operation of the public sector, but it would at the very least make it more amenable to reform and improvement.