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The Regional Losers of the
Iran's Nuclear Quest
By Tim Eaton
‘The world will not
permit the Iranian regime to gain nuclear weapons’, a confident
President Bush stated bluntly earlier this month after succeeding in
officially reporting Iran’s clandestine nuclear activity to the UN
Security Council. The President’s comments scarcely veiled US
bellicosity towards Iran, and will be seen by many as a statement of
intent. Yet many feel the President overreached himself. On February
5th The New York Times quoted a senior
un-named Bush official, admitting “Sooner or later, it's going to
happen.” The emergence of an Iranian nuclear arsenal would send
shockwaves through the Middle East, serving to further de-stabilize an
already turbulent region.
Nuclear bombs are a symbol of prestige and political power, and are
equally potent in this regard as they are as weapons of mass
destruction. Aside from the possibility of embroiling the region in
another war, the Iranian bomb would be another indicator of the
resurgence of Persian Shi’ism; adding to the concerns of Iran’s Arab
Sunni neighbors in the wake of the election of a Tehran-friendly Shi’a
led government in Iraq, the recent Iranian overtures declaring an
intent to provide funding to the Hamas government, and Ahmadinejad’s
quest to take the lead on the Palestinian question.
Both Saudi Arabia and Egypt consider themselves regional leaders,
albeit in different respects; Saudi Arabia sees itself as the
spiritual leader, whilst Egypt likes to think of itself as a
superpower in the region. A nuclear Iran would seriously tarnish the
prestige and image of both respective regimes. The Khomeini Islamic
revolution of 1979 was initially a very dangerous development for many
of the established neighboring regimes, which feared the export of the
Ayatollah’s movement. But the bloody violence of the Islamic
revolution and its bellicose attitude towards the Western democracies,
particularly the US, led not only to a long-term stagnation of Iran’s
economy, but also served to make the state an international pariah.
This development served to benefit Egypt and Saudi Arabia, increasing
their standing in the region at Iran’s expense. Both nations now face
anew the threat of a resurgent Iran breaking out of its 27-year
isolation, returning to its pre-revolution status as a major regional
power.
Nevertheless, whilst Egypt and Saudi Arabia
would surely want to join the nuclear club to counter Iran, their
prospects for doing so are negligible. In spite of recent
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chastisement of Egypt for “a
number of reporting failures relating to certain nuclear material and
facilities,” it remains highly doubtful whether Egypt would, in the
foreseeable future, have the financial capacity or technological
advancement necessary to develop nuclear weaponry. Equally, despite
allegations leveled against Saudi Arabia over a suspected nuclear deal
with Pakistan in 2003 (October 20th
2003, United Press International),
it must be emphasized that the Saudi nuclear program is far, far
behind that of Tehran’s.
Despite their concerns, the press statements of these Arab
states have been restricted by Islamic discourse, and have thus been
careful not to overtly condemn the Iranian nuclear program, opting
instead for a more conciliatory stance. After all, leaders of Muslim
countries can hardly oppose an Islamic country seeking a nuclear bomb
when Israel has over 200 of her own. Consequently, Saudi Foreign
Minister Saud Al-Faysal has diplomatically expressed his hope that
“Iran will resist this temptation [to develop nuclear weapons].”
Meanwhile, Egyptian Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit has emphasized that
Iran should be allowed to seek nuclear capability for peaceful means,
whilst re-iterating the long-standing Arab grievance that Israel is
not subject to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Although some Arab states clearly do fear the Iranian nuclear program
for the impact it will have on regional power politics, many states in
the Gulf have cause to fear more explosive consequences. The
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was established in 1981, partly to
counter the threat of post-revolution Iran. The Council includes
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and the UAE. These
countries, which are all hereditary monarchies, will continue to
regard the actions and – perhaps more importantly – ambitions of the
Iranian republic with skepticism and foreboding.
So far the press statements of the GCC leaders have remained
tight-lipped. Aside from expressing concerns of a Middle Eastern
equivalent of Chernobyl, the GCC has been trapped into mirroring the
conciliatory position of the other Arab nations, emphasizing the need
for a nuclear-free Middle East. However, in light of US Secretary of
State Rice’s declaration to “actively confront” the policies of the
Iranian regime, the GCC nations, as US allies in the region, must
undoubtedly conclude that they may face retaliation from Iran in the
event of a US military strike.
Retaliation could take a variety of forms. In the immediate aftermath
of the Iranian revolution, active subversion was rife in the
surrounding states. A prominent example of the effect of such
activity ended in Khomeini making an open call for the heads of the
Saud monarchy, after Saudi Arabia put down subversive Iranian agents
in Mecca in 1987 (300 Iranians died in the process). It should also
be noted that Iran is alleged to have sponsored attempts on the lives
of Bahrain’s ruling elite in the early 1980’s. Relations have since
improved, but the Gulf States, whose ruling dynasties will not have
forgotten Iran’s previous clandestine activity, surely fear renewed
operations and appeals to the significant Shi’ite elements within
their pre-dominantly Sunni states.
Bahrain would be particularly vulnerable since 70 percent its
population is Shi’a, whilst the ruling elite remains Sunni. There are
also sizeable Shi’ite elements in Kuwait (40 percent), Oman (25
percent), the UAE (16 percent), and even Saudi Arabia (14 percent).
Furthermore, the Shi’a groups are mostly concentrated near the borders
of their respective states, and could hence provide a credible
security threat. Tehran would undoubtedly seek to use its anti-West
rhetoric to mobilize support and inflame opposition, discrediting the
regimes of the Gulf States by branding their leaders as servants of
the “Great Satan”, perpetuating the Gulf States’ image in the popular
Arab mind as U.S. military bases.
Interestingly, a poll by Zogby International in 2005 found that the
overwhelming majority of Arabs had a greater fear of Israel and the US
than a nuclear-armed Iran. Although they cannot say so in public, it
is unlikely that the majority of Arab leaders share such a view at
this point in time. |
