Lebanese scholar Fouad Ajami, who
contributes often to the
influential, conservative Wall Street Journal opinion pages and is known to consult with the Bush
Administration on Middle East affairs, originally became known for his
dense essay collection The Dream Palace of the Arabs, which harshly criticizes
his fellow Arabs for their adoption of failed ideologies such as Arab
nationalism, and what he characterized as unrealistic
stances on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Now it is clear, at least from its recent actions
and words, that the Bush administration suffers from its own delusions
in the region, principally that Arabs want to and are ready create
liberal democracies that will support American foreign policy goals
for the region. Foremost among these is the protection of Israel, by
means of billions of dollars in military and economic aid, loan
support, and a seemingly unlimited supply of diplomatic goodwill. The
fact remains, however, that deep anger at Israel and at America’s
increasingly unconditional support for it is widespread across nearly
all political currents. Nothing (except perhaps for higher bread
prices) brings people to the streets faster than graphic images of
Arab children killed by Israeli bombs. Consequently, nothing does more
to lay bare the unrepresentative nature of autocrats allied with the
United States than their willingness to buck popular opinion and more
or less align themselves with U.S. policy. Since the outset of the current conflict in
Lebanon, Arab satellite channels and newspapers have deluged
viewers and readers with gut-wrenching photographs of dead civilians
many of them children, while juxtaposing these with
Arab leaders’ statements that demonstrate either co-option or
powerlessness.
Islamist groups that vociferously reject Israel
(most notably Hamas, Hizbullah, and the non-violent Muslim Brotherhood here
in Egypt) find it easy to gain still more ground upon their
political competitors in such an environment. Liberal activists, by
contrast, find their
voices drowned out and their causes shunted to the sidelines.
It is as if the war in Lebanon is a giant vortex, pulling all and
sundry into its deadly spiral. For instance, the Egyptian Lawyers’
Syndicate (the equivalent of the U.S. Bar Association), a key player
in the past few years of reformist activism, has shifted its focus
from internal political reform to largely symbolic solidarity with
Hamas, Hizbullah, and Palestinian and Lebanon civilians. Nearly every
columnist now seems to be training his rhetorical guns on Israel and
the United States, criticizing the Egyptian government’s foreign
policy while mostly ignoring domestic concerns.
As for street activists, they have temporarily put
aside calls for freedom of expression and judicial independence, as
evidenced by the growing demonstrations in Cairo over the fighting in Lebanon and Gaza. On July 29th, a heated demonstration against
Israel that took place after Friday prayers at Al-Azhar was violently
dispersed by Egyptian riot police. Then on the following Sunday, about
100 opposition and independent members of the People’s Assembly, the
vast majority of whom are Muslim Brothers, staged a walkout in the
Parliament in protest of the NDP’s refusal to allow for a debate of
the current situation in Lebanon. Joined by another few hundred other
Egyptians as well as the media, the deputies marched on the Arab
League to demand a meeting with its General Secretary, Amr Moussa. The
walkout was intended to show solidarity with the Palestinians in Gaza
and with Hizballah in Lebanon, but it was also designed to embarrass
the NDP, none of whose members attended. Shouts of “O Nasrallah, O
Beloved, Strike, Strike Tel Aviv” and calls for jihad. Populist
rabble-rouser Mustapha Bakry, an independent member of the People’s
Assembly and the editor of The Week (Al-Osboa)
said that the lack of presence of the NDP deputies confirms
that the government does not express the will of the people.
In a recent speech, U.S. President Bush said that
groups like Hamas “fear democracy”. These groups do not “fear
democracy,” however, insofar as democracy means little more than
direct elections--as
Washington itself has unfortunately come to define the term
(e.g., in Iraq). It has been demonstrated that these entities can do
quite well in elections, and that, as they themselves are fond of
reminding us, their legitimacy comes “from the street” and not from
outside.
Analysts who have linked terrorism to a lack of
democracy are correct when they argue that groups that are barred from
participating in politics will seek to attain their goals by other,
i.e. violent means. This analysis is most applicable when it refers to
entities like al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya, although it becomes slightly
complicated when referring self-labeled resistance groups like
Hizbullah and Hamas. But in general, the theory goes that greater
political participation will decrease terrorism. Terrorism is a
complex problem whose solution will only come with progress along a
range of fronts (for example, solving regional disputes such as the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict
and Kashmir is equally if not more important), but democracy
certainly has to be a major part of any lasting solution.
The Bush Administration appears to be “pulling an
Algeria” in Palestine, Lebanon, and possibly Egypt by encouraging
Islamist groups to participate in elections and then seeking to
isolate or crush them when they, given the current environment, win.
Condoleezza Rice admitted that the United States was caught by
surprise in January when Hamas beat its more moderate rival Fatah in
an election that was judged largely free and fair by international
observers. Based on the U.S. behavior since that time—for example, its
barely audible response to Mubarak’s cancellation of the municipal
elections as well as the passage of Judicial and Press Laws that fall
far short of reformist demands—it is clear that had the U.S. known
that Hamas would do so well, it would not have been calling so vocally
for free and fair elections in Palestine. Raising expectations and
them dashing them in this manner is a dangerous game that has already
led to great bloodshed and misery in Gaza—now a failed state if it was
not already.
An adjunct of this erratic American approach is to
isolate the two countries, Syria, and Iran, that fiercely oppose U.S. and
Israeli policies and support rejectionist groups such as Hamas,
Hizballah, Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine to one extent or another. One can imagine few strategies
more conducive to provoking a violent, asymmetrical response by these
actors. Syria and Iran are ideological states to a certain extent, but
they are also shrewd, realistic players that sponsor violence in order to create leverage.
The Islamist groups fighting Israel enjoy widespread popular
support, and as such are authentic expressions of Palestinian and
Lebanese sentiments; there is, however, some debate over to what
extent Syria and Iran controls each one. In any case, both states have
an interest in promoting instability in the region, whereby they give
themselves bargaining chips. Since the Bush administration has
indicated that it views negotiation itself as the equivalent of
capitulation, and does not want to “legitimate” authoritarian
governments that oppose American policies, Iran and Syria are likely
to continue. Neither government is seriously threatened by its
disorganized opposition, and in fact both have been strengthened
internally by the threat of American intervention. Refusing to talk to
them other than to issue diktats that no leader can accept and save
face, then, appears to serve no purpose whatsoever.
The Democrats in Congress appear to be little smarter than the Bush
administration. Last week Democratic leaders condemned Iraqi Prime
Minister Jawad Al-Malaki for comments he made of that were critical of
Israel, and demanded that he retract his remarks before addressing a
special joint session of Congress. They got nowhere due to Republican
opposition, but such political posturing to a domestic audience
threatens to undermine a key U.S. ally (one who actually does enjoy
some popular legitimacy) at a critical time for a deteriorating Iraq.
Radical Shi’ite cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr is seizing the opportunity to
boost his own popularity at Al-Malaki’s expense by calling the latter
a U.S. puppet and by sending members
of his Mahdi Army militia to Lebanon to fight the Israelis, and
there are even rumors within the dominant Shi’ite bloc of a coup in
the works.
There’s a kind of raccoon trap where you drill or
countersink a hole in a log, then nail a few nails pointing downward
that are spaced just wide enough to allow a furry paw to enter. You
put a shiny object, like a piece of tinfoil, in the hole and wait for
the raccoon to discover it. So entranced by his treasure, he won’t be willing to let
go, and thus his balled little fist won’t make it past the
nails. Sound familiar?
The only way out of the current trap in the Middle
East is for American leaders to let go of the fiction that there are
American-style liberals waiting in the wings who will make
peace with Israel and implement free-market reforms. The U.S. needs to
accept that one can still be a democrat and oppose American support
for Israel. The short-run reality is that Islamists who oppose U.S.
foreign policy in the region will be the immediate beneficiaries of a genuine
democratization policy. A vacillating policy only makes this outcome more
likely by providing confirmation of widespread suspicions in
the region that the U.S. does not really want democracy here.