May  06 Newsletter

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  Domestic Terrorism as a Political Survival Strategy
Lenka Benova

 In line with the growing pressures to extend political participation, both Egypt and Saudi Arabia have recently implemented limited political reforms, dubbed “survival strategies” rather than seeking genuine progress toward transparent and democratic rule.  Municipal elections in Saudi Arabia and both presidential and parliamentary elections in Egypt in 2005 are examples of providing a limited scope of political participation for citizens in order to prevent a further decline in legitimacy of the regimes.

            The use of violence – specifically terrorism, is rarely the first choice in practical strategies to influence decisions, rather, it is the last resort of groups that lack political space to express opinions and influence both political leaders and the general public.    When violence is employed by opposition to discredit an authoritarian regime, it will necessarily attract the illegitimate label of terrorism, despite repressive regime policies being the very reason for such extremism.  However, can a regime use the label of terrorism not only to de-legitimize opposition groups, but also to perpetuate itself?

            The last 15 years have witnessed a changing pattern of domestic terrorism in both Saudi Arabia and Egypt that are important to highlight in order to understand how terrorism strengthens the authoritarian regimes in these two countries. Three stages characterize this development; in the first phase (the 1990s in Saudi Arabia and pre-1990 Egypt), a low frequency of attacks orchestrated by a multitude of groups caused a relatively low number of fatalities. Neither a general united front of insurgents nor a specific target of their grievances or political agendas can be identified.  Rapid change occurred in the next stage, when full-scale domestic terrorist operations (1990-97 in Egypt and 2000-2004 in Saudi Arabia) gained in frequency of attacks and their primary target became easily identifiable. Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia targeted mainly Western expatriates (car bombs) in retaliation for the unwanted presence of US troops in the Kingdom following the Iraq-Kuwait war.  Al-Gama’ al-Islamiya in Egypt carried out bomb attacks as well as shootings at tourists primarily in Upper Egypt. Both governments responded to such high-scale attacks with intense anti-terrorist measures.  Since approximately the year 2000, both Saudi Arabia and Egypt are in the third stage of domestic terrorism. Major similarities that they share in this phase are:

• Prevalence in attacks by “unknown” groups, or conflicting claims of responsibility, but targets are well-defined as these groups seem to be aiming at the symbols of the current regime – police force and strategic oil installations in Saudi Arabia whilst tourists and police are targeted in Egypt. 

• Most of the fatalities are country nationals, foreigners are not targeted aside for  the reason of increased media coverage. 

• Cases of attacks are normally settled in shootouts with suspects, without a further public elaboration on the agenda, grievances, size or potential for future attacks from the perspective of these “unknown” groups. Accusations of responsibility are shifted from one uncomfortable group to another in an attempt to discredit and silence their claims.

      Lower intensity terrorist activity creates conditions for legitimizing extraordinary measures aimed at protecting the security of the state. For instance, recent attacks in Dahab provided substantiation for a renewal Egypt’s emergency law, continuously upheld since 1981, by arguing that it will take additional two years to produce an anti-terror legislation in substitute for the extraordinary powers of this law. Yet, such rationale fails the test of over 50 years of authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Saudi Arabia – their repressive policies and extensive powers to deal with terrorist and other uncomfortable groups have failed to stop deadly attacks from occurring.  As Hanny Megally  of Human Rights Watch noted in 2003, the extension of Egypt’s emergency law “exemplifies the opportunism of governments exploiting the threat of terrorism to restrict their own people’s rights and freedoms. The real emergency in Egypt is the government’s renewal of the Emergency Law for another three years.”

 In terms of affecting strategic financial flows of the two regimes, Saudi Arabia’s refinery attack in early 2006 had no palpable negative consequence on oil extraction or exportation. As for Egypt, whereas large scale terrorist attacks of the 1990s had an effect on lowering the numbers of tourists in the country, this decrease was extremely short lived; the number of new arrivals surpassed 8 million in 2004.  At the same time, the media coverage of the three major attacks in the Sinai peninsula over the past years have not failed to underscore the fact that all occurred on Egyptians holidays and disproportionately affected Egyptians. Therefore, foreign tourist receipts are not necessarily expected to decline in response to the attacks within the third phase of domestic terrorism.

            The threat of terrorism can serve to legitimate a large and strong military and police presence, in addition to international military and financial support in the global fighting against terrorism.  Relative to population Middle East is the most militarized region in the world; the Egyptian army size increased by approximately 50% between 1977 and 2004, whilst military expenditure increased by over 100% between 1992 and 2002, reaching 16 billion Egyptian pounds. Despite the fact that economic aid from the United States is being gradually reduced (from over $2 billion annually in 1979 to $400 million per year by 2008), US military grants amounted to $1.3 billion in 2004.

            Saudi Arabia is the largest arms importer, having purchased over 7 billion US dollars worth of military equipment between 1997-2004 from the United States alone. Moreover, its defense budget comprises almost 30% of the state annual expenditures. Although US economic aid to Saudi Arabia ended in 1959, the Kingdom remains a strategic geographical and trade partner with the States. However, despite touting military establishments of impressive size and strength, both regimes have not only failed in the task of national defense, but in preventing domestic terrorism as well.  Yet, this failure has not stopped from further investment and expansion of the army, as it is a key protection element in maintaining current regimes in power.

            The appearance of victim of terrorism as opposed to being a supporter of terrorism can be helpful not only in explanation of the continuation in repressive and undemocratic measures, but also in  showing support to the global fight against terrorism. This case applies particularly to Saudi Arabia, which the US  9/11 Commission described as “a problematic ally in combating Islamic extremism”. Through its own experience of domestic attacks, Saudi Arabia can now transform from the base of Al-Qaeda to a partner working closely with the United States to combat terrorism.

            Yet, the potential to extract legitimacy from terrorism is restricted by the scale and intensity of attacks themselves. As long as high government officials are not affected, these attacks can be portrayed as random and their political agenda diffused. Operational experience of these groups will improve and may eventually strike against high-profile targets. By not taking clues as to the real grievances of these repressed opposition voices, the regimes of Egypt and Saudi Arabia are putting at stake their own ability to keep the country in order.  Low-intensity domestic terrorism affords for legitimization of repressive measures against political opponents, enables the financing of a large military force and provides for international support in this political strategy. Therefore, political grievances of these insurgents are not only ignored, but human lives continue to be lost in the ongoing “survival strategy” that benefits from the state of emergency within the country’s borders.  Unfortunately, the current authoritarian regimes continue to make use of this state of emergency that they themselves gave rise to through repressive policies.