Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World. Annual Report. 2004
Published July 2005

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Egypt

Capital : Cairo
Date of Independence : 28/2/1922
Area : 1,001,450 Km
Population (in millions) : 77 (est. 2005)
Rate of Population Increase : 1.88% (est. 2005)
Ethnic Groups : 99% Egyptians, Bedou, Berber, 1% Greeks, Nubians, Armenians and other Europeans (Italians and French)
Religious Groups : 94% Muslims (93%Sunna, 1% Shiaa) and 6% Christian Copts
Illiteracy : 42%
No. of Provinces : 26 governorates
Polity : Republic
Head of State : Muhammad Hosni Mubarak
No. of Political Parties : 19
GDP (in millions)ppp : $316,300 (2004)
GDP per Capitappp : $4,200 (2004)

Overview
 

Egypt gained formal independence from Great Britain in 1922. In 1952, a military coup led by Colonel Gamal Abdel-Nasser overthrew the monarchy and established a military dictatorship. The period of Nasser’s rule, which lasted until his death in 1970, was marked by a deep hostility toward the West, and witnessed two wars with Israel, in 1956 and 1967. Nasser and his successor Anwar al-Sadat established a strong presidential political system that was largely dependent on a pervasive security apparatus that maintained a firm grip on all aspects of civil society. Following the assassination of Sadat in 1981, Hosni Mubarak, an air force general who was then Vice President, became president and declared a state of emergency which he has since renewed every three years (recently in June 2003). In the early 1990s Islamic militant groups in an effort to overthrow the government conducted a wave of terrorist attacks against the police, top government officials, the Christian Copts, and foreign tourists. The bitter fight against these groups lasted for several years; by 1998 the government had succeeded in destroying the militants’ infrastructure in Egypt. In the process, the government jailed thousands of suspected Islamists, and cracked down on political dissent. Although the armed sector of the militant Islamists was effectively destroyed by 1998, the government continued to severely restrict civil and political liberties, while seeking to enhance its legitimacy by burnishing its Islamic credentials. At present, Egypt is suffering from an ailing economy since the late 1990s, a high level of unemployment, particularly among college graduates, and endemic corruption at all levels.
 

Political Rights and Civil Liberties
 

1. The Executive, Political Parties and Elections. The President dominates the entire political arena. He is not chosen directly by the people in a competitive election, but is nominated by the People’s Assembly (Parliament) and is confirmed in a national referendum. The last such referendum was in 1999 when President Hosni Mubarak won his fourth 6-year term by 93.8% of the national vote. The President appoints the Prime Minister, the cabinet and the Governors of Egypt’s 26 provinces. There are 17 legally recognized political parties. Political parties based on religion are prohibited. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) as an organization (that acts very much like a party) is banned, hence its candidates run in the elections as independents, but their true affiliation is well known and they express their views openly. The ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) dominates the Parliament. All other parties are extremely weak, with many being parties in name only. This is attested to by the fact that in the last national elections held in 2000 the opposition won only seven seats in the 454–seat parliament, the independents 13 seats, and the Muslim Brothers 17 seats; The remaining 417 seats (including the 10 appointed by the President) are taken by NDP members. The assembly has limited effective power, restricted to introducing minor modifications to the bills which are invariably initiated by the executive. Many policies and initiatives, however, are simply carried out by administrative decree by-passing the legislature altogether. With such extensive executive power and its dominance over the legislature, the constitutional right of citizens to change their government remains a purely theoretical one.

Political parties cannot be established unless licensed by the NDP-dominated Political Parties Committee (PPC)―which so far it has never done. All existing parties other than the original four established by Sadat in 1976, have been licensed as a result of a court ruling that overturned the PPC decision. Besides the Parliament a 264-seat Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura)of which two thirds are elected and one third appointed by the Presidentacts in an advisory capacity, and reports to the President on the proposed legislations. Among the appointees to the Consultative Council are 8 women and 4 Christians.

National elections have been traditionally seriously flawed by extensive vote rigging and intimidation of opposition candidates and their supporters, especially those suspected of Islamist leanings. But the last elections of 2000 were conducted under partial judicial supervision, which helped to eliminate some of the more blatant irregularities related to vote rigging. But this was offset by the arrest of hundreds of Muslim Brotherhood supporters prior to the elections, and the use of security forces to obstruct voters in pro-Islamist districts. These strong-arm tactics by the police led to clashes that left 10 dead and many more injured. In April 2002, the NDP won 97% of the seats in municipal elections. The suffocating grip of the regime over all political life has driven political parties, even those that stand at opposite ends of the ideological spectrum, to seek the formation of a common front.
 

2. The Judiciary, Trials, and Detention. The normal civil and criminal courts are generally competent, fair and independent of the executive. Trials are open and procedural safeguards are usually observed. However, political and security cases are tried in either military or State Security Courts, which come under the strong influence of the executive, and in which many constitutional rights are denied. Under pressure from many Egyptian intellectuals, human rights organizations, and the criticism of Egypt’s Western allies, the President declared in 2003 that the government will submit a bill to the Parliament for the elimination of the State Security Courts, leaving in place the emergency military courts to try only cases of terrorism, and conspiracies designed to destabilize the regime. But by the end of 2004 the proposed legislation was still pending.

The Emergency Law by which Egypt is ruled since 1981 restricts many basic rights. Its provisions allow for arrests without warrant and prolonged detention without charge. Mistreatment by the police is commonplace. In November 2003, Amnesty International stated in its report that “everyone taken into detention in Egypt is at risk of torture.” The authorities seldom investigated the complaints of abuse and torture— sometimes to death—many of which were recorded by the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights in its report issued on April 16, 2003. In 21/9/2003, Mossaad Qutb, an accountant and a member of the Muslim Brothers, was tortured and died at the hands of the state security police, and on 14/11/2003, Mohammed Abdel-Sattar al-Rubi met a similar fate. On November 4, 2002, a report by Human Rights Watch estimated that since March of that year no less than 13 died as a result of torture. But during 2004, the government convicted 14 police officers for abuse and torture of prisoners.

3. Civil Society and the Freedom of Association. Freedom of association and assembly is heavily restricted. NGOs cannot attain legal status unless licensed by and registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA). Law 84 of 2002 also allows MOSA to interfere in the activities of NGOs and to revoke the license of any NGO by administrative decreea power previously reserved to the courts. After 18 years of withholding official recognition, human rights organizations were finally allowed to register. In 2004, the government itself also established the "National Council for Human Rights." Registration of NGOs is sometimes denied on the basis of obscure “security reasons.” A case in point is that of the “New Woman Center for Research” which eventually sued and won a court ruling ordering MOSA to allow it to register, but by years end the ruling was not implemented. Despite the constraints imposed on the freedom of NGOs, there are at present about 30 associations concerned with human rights or some specific elements of these rights, such as torture or the rights of prisoners.

Demonstrations are allowed provided prior permit is obtained, but this is usually denied except in rare cases when it serves the interest of the regime to demonstrate the existence of domestic popular opposition to American policies in the region which the President happens to disapprove of.

The law restricts the formation and activities of labor unions. There are 23 trade unions, all required to belong to the Egyptian Trade Union Federation which is the sole legally recognized labor federation. The International Labor Organization (ILO) has criticized single federations as an infringement on the freedom of association.
 

4. Freedom of Speech and the Media. Though the Penal Code and the Press Law contain vaguely worded statutes that would severely restrict freedom of speech, yet in practice freedom of expression is largely available, and the opposition press is able to criticize the government in the harshest of terms, though direct attack on the President is avoided since the law prohibits anything that may be construed as “undermining the dignity” of the Head of State.

While the government was tolerant of free expression if restricted to the written word it was far less so toward NGOs that engage in advocacy, and absolutely intolerant of those that take their activism to the streets. The Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies which dared to cross the final red line was shut down and its founder and chairman sociologist, Prof. Saad Eddin Ibrahim and 27 of the Center’s staff were arrested and brought to trial in a State Security Court on charges that included defaming Egypt abroad, and receiving foreign funds without authorization ($250,000 from the EU) to raise voters’ political awareness and encourage citizen participation in elections. After three years and two heavily flawed trials that sentenced Dr. Ibrahim to 7 years imprisonment, Egypt’s Court of Cassation finally, in a landmark ruling, in March 2003, acquitted him and his colleagues of all charges.

The Penal Code and libel laws also prohibit criticism of the military or foreign leaders. Open public discussion of sectarian tensions between Muslims and the Christian Copts is discouraged as a topic that fosters the divisiveness within the Egyptian society. The President, under continuous pressure from the Syndicate of Journalists, accepted to eliminate imprisonment as a penalty for defamation, but the bill when presented to parliament was defeated, indicating clearly that strong forces of the old guard within the ruling party felt threatened by increasing the margin of press freedom.

The broadcast media is entirely owned and strictly controlled by the state, and presents the official point of view except for occasional instances when opposition personalities are given brief access to present alternative views. Satellite TV is freely available as well as access to the internet.

5. Freedom of Religion. The Constitution maintains that Islam is the religion of the state, and is the main source of legislation while providing for freedom of religion and the practice of religious rites. However, the government places restrictions on the building or renovation of churches which are not applicable to the building of mosques. Moreover, a deeply entrenched institutionalized discrimination against the Copts is practiced by the State. Thus no Christian Copt has ever served as a governor (save once), or a police commissioner, or city mayor, or a university president or dean. There are few Copts in the upper ranks of the armed forces, and practically none in the security services. Further, while the Azhar University is supported by public funds it accepts only Muslims. Although not specifically banned in the Constitution, the government prohibits proselytizing by non-Muslims, or the conversion of Muslims to another faith. Converts from Islam to Christianity while not legally prosecuted, nevertheless face societal discrimination and governmental harassment which may include repeated questioning, denial of travel abroad, and the refusal to amend civil documents to reflect their new religious status. The government has sought to control the sermons in mosques because of incidents where radical Islamists took advantage of this religious forum to incite people to subversive activities.

6. Women and the Marginalized. The Constitution provides for equality between the sexes, but in practice, certain laws and social customs discriminate against women. The Penal Code penalizes a wife guilty of adultery with a heavy prison sentence, while an adulterous husband is exempt from punishment unless the crime takes place in the marital home. Personal Status Law also discriminates against women with regard to divorce and child custody.

Women represent about 30% of the entire workforce, but in certain field they are more heavily represented, such as the educational sector (45%), and the government bureaucracy (38%). About 13% have attained high-ranking posts in the government (general director, under secretary, or cabinet minister). The Judiciary, however, remains closed to women, although, in late 2003, the President appointed the first female judge to the bench of the Supreme Constitutional Court.

Women have a very low participation rate in politics. Only two women won a contested seat in the 454-seat parliament, seven others were appointed by the President who is by law entitled to allocate 10 parliamentary seats. Numerous NGOs focus exclusively on women’s concerns. The Egyptian government has shown considerable concern for women’s rights, thanks to the persistent efforts of the First Lady, Mrs. Susan Mubarak. A Presidential Decree in 2000 established the National Council for Women (chaired by Mrs. Mubarak), which plays an important role in proposing and advocating policies that promote women’s empowerment, and designs development programs that benefit women.

Although the Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion, the Coptic Christians, who represent about 10% of the population, complain of a governmental bias against them. They point to restrictions imposed on the building of churches or their repair (while mosques are exempt from such restrictions), and their very low representation—far lower than their weight in the population—in the higher echelons of government. While the President himself, and his closest advisors have been sympathetic to Coptic demands, and the rights of women. There are 7 Copts in the 454-seat Parliament, 6 of whom were appointed by the President. The 32-member cabinet has also 2 Coptic ministers. However, the pervasive Islamist trend in the country continues to constitute an impediment to the desired liberal reform that would recognize the full rights of women and do away with all forms of discrimination against Copts.

Prospects for Democratic Change

Perhaps among all Arab countries, Egypt has the most developed institutional infrastructure that could sustain a full-fledged democratic system. Moreover, Egyptians are not unfamiliar with democratic practices, which prevailed during the first half of the Twentieth Century. At present, the entire political discourse, among both the public and within the government, is saturated with the call for reform, but little reform seems to be taking place. The odd phenomenon is that the opposition is almost unrestricted in its freedom of expression, but is totally ineffective in terms of causing any change, no doubt partly due to the severe constraints placed on their public demonstrations and contact with the masses.. The malaise seems to reside in the great weakness of political parties. It is only when parties succeed in taking root among the general population and are able to aggregate and articulate the various interests in society that the hopes for a transition to a genuine democracy will be close to fulfillment. So far the regime keeps promising political reform but has exhibited a marked reluctance to take serious steps in that direction. But a ground swell is already underway driven by more vehement demands by opposition parties and numerous human rights organizations. It remains, however, that the most single element pushing the regime to democratize is the persistent pressure coming from the West, particularly the United States. Should this external pressure continue unremittingly it will give a strong boost to the domestic parties calling for reform even though the latter continue to disclaim their dependence on any help from abroad.