Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World. Annual Report. 2004
Published July 2005

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Introduction
Definitions and Criteria
 

This survey is principally concerned with political systems in the Arab World insofar as they relate to freedom and human rights. The concept of freedom we address here is to be understood in its narrow political sense which is the value and goal of genuine democratic regimes. A survey of democratic freedom is often assumed to entail a survey of human rights. But these two concepts are distinct despite the considerable overlap between them. A free majority in a democratic system may very well deny basic human rights to a particular minority or some specific individuals or groups within society. Indeed it is this potential danger within a free democracy which led de Tocqueville to warn against the “tyranny of the majority.” For example, if politically active Muslim fundamentalists are arrested for their ideas and mistreated in prisons this would constitute a clear violation of their human rights, yet this, in a free democratic society, may be passively approved of by the majority of the population; nor does this violation necessarily impair freedom of expression or political democracy for the vast majority.

The core definition of freedom adopted in this survey is that people are free to the extent that they actually have a choice in determining the nature of their political, and socio-economic systems. Thus a system that imposes a “social good,” which may even be a factor that serves democratic valuessuch as, for example, reducing large inequalities in wealthis in fact undemocratic, since the policy was not freely chosen through democratic mechanisms.

Free contested elections are the sine qua non of a democracy, but a focus on the characteristics of the voting process and the turnout at the polls is of little meaning without the civil liberties that must complement these elections.

The purpose of this survey then is to give a general picture of the political rights and civil liberties in each of the 19 Arab countries considered.^

These two conceptspolitical rights and civil libertiesreferred to in this report must therefore be (briefly) identified, so too must the concept of “authoritarianism” the degree of which is defined precisely by the extent to which political rights and civil liberties are denied.
 

Political Rights. In a democracy these rights involve: (i) the right to participate meaningfully in the political process through fair and free contested elections; (ii) universal suffrage; (iii) the right of all adults to compete for public office; (iv) that elected representatives (legislatures) be able to legislate, and hence have a decisive voice in public policy, in addition to scrutinizing government performance and holding it accountable; and most importantly (v) the right to change the government, and the means to do so by established legitimate processes.
 

Civil Rights. These are basically (i) the right to free expressionincluding most importantly the freedom of the press and the broadcast media; (ii) the freedom to organize and demonstrate, (iii) the freedom of association; (iv) the freedom of religion; and (v) the freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention and from torture or other forms of abuseand its corollary, the right to a fair trial by an independent judiciary.

The combination of these political rights and civil liberties clearly lie at the heart of democracy, but a genuine functioning democratic system requires additional institutional elements and conditions:

The first is a democratic constitution that is adhered to. For no matter how fair and free the elections, and no matter how large the government’s majority, democracy must have a constitution that itself is democraticin that it respects fundamental libertiesand the elected government must rule within the confines of that constitution, and in conjunction with a complex set of other institutions, within both the state and civil society, that help to ensure accountability. The second is the opportunity for the development of a robust and critical civil society that helps check the state and constantly generate alternatives. For such civil society alternatives to be aggregated and implemented, political society, especially political parties, should be allowed unfettered relations with civil society.
 

An authoritarian system was defined by Linz as “one in which there is limited … political pluralismwithout elaborate and guiding ideology (but with distinctive mentalities), without intensive or extensive political mobilization, and in which the leader (or a small group) exercises power within formally ill-defined limits, but actually quite predictable ones.” Although the literature is replete with other definitions, this one serves our purpose well enough.

Authoritarian regimes come in a variety of types: military, single party, dominant party, personal or traditional or some combination of features from these various types. Authoritarian regimes are not necessarily resented by their people. Indeed, some are deeply populistthey cultivate the sentiments of and are much admired by the mass of citizens. In varying degrees all authoritarian regimes seek to exercise a very tight control over both the direction of governmental policy and the expression of free opinions by citizens. The defining feature of all authoritarian regimes is that the ruling party, be it a group or an individual (monarch, president or sultan) dominates the political arena while allowing a margin of freedomdefined as the degree of liberalizationwhich might be small or relatively large, within civil society.

While no doubt liberalization improves the quality of life, and might be the handmaiden of democracy, the two concepts are quite different. While both are desirable, and are indeed twin features of the democratic West, yet they should not be conflated.

Thus, for instance, several Arab monarchsall of whom exercise enormous executive powerhave taken significant steps to liberalize their regimes. This degree of liberalization is often takenerroneouslyto indicate a measure of democracy. But only titular monarchs can preside over a democracy. Monarchs who wield executive powernot to mention also at least some legislative powers, as all Arab monarchs domay go a long way towards liberalizing their country but they can never establish a democracy since a democratic regime must entail the possibility of replacing the government, including the supreme executivei.e. in this case, the King. It also involves the necessity of placing supreme power in the hands of the people and their representativesa situation that the present Arab monarchs and presidents cannot of course contemplate. Moreover, a democracy holds no one immuneas are Arab monarchs and presidents and their familiesfrom public criticism. In short, democracy is based on certain types of institutions and political practices that permit constitutional change of government via popular elections.

And thus all that can be said of Arab rulers who liberalize is that at best they are enlighted autocrats. Noteworthy, is that the regimes of Arab Presidents, as the present survey indicates, are by and large mostly less liberal than those of the monarchies (barring Saudi Arabia).

The pressing issue with such regimes is whether the liberal steps they take do in fact move them towards a transition to durable stable democratic forms of rule, or are they merely a tactical retreat under internal and/or international pressures which can be reversed once the pressures are lifted, or once the liberal opening proves ineffective in dealing with the intractable problems they face.

If Arab countries are to democratize then the first and most fundamental step is to establish the rules of the democratic game which must begin with establishing a constitution that strictly limits the power of the executive especially that of monarchs and presidents, and transfer ultimate power to the people and their representatives in national legislatures and local councils. We cannot begin to speak of a democratic change so long as the supreme seat of power remains in the hand of an all-powerful monarch or president, as is the case so far in all Arab countries.

The second basic step to the establishment of democracy is that the norm should be rule of law rather than rule by law^* where the ruler through informal mechanisms and pressures influences court rulings. Also, to speak of constitutional guarantees in the presence of conditional clausesas in the case of all Arab constitutionswhich grant broad political freedoms and civil rights then qualify them with vague restrictive phrasesthat are always subject to the interpretation of the rulerlike "provided they don’t violate generally accepted moral or societal values" is to nullify all guarantees, and perpetuate authoritarian rule.

While all reform must spring in the first instance from the efforts of the people of each Arab country and be motivated by their determined will to strive and sacrifice in order to force the change on their reluctant rulers, yet the developed democracies of America and Europe have also a vital role to play if local efforts are to succeed: that of providing an enabling international environment that would support and enhance the local efforts. Such external support needs to be carefully measured. Direct overt intervention will be counterproductive, for not only will it be resented by the people, but it will also undermine the efforts of the pro-democratic elements in society who will be branded as mere agents promoting a Western agenda.

Comments on the Political Rights and Civil Liberties Addressed in this Report:
 

1. Political regimes vary in the degree to which they enable voters to participate meaningfully in the system. This predominately means offering voters a choice between competing candidates for public office, and a workable democratic mechanism by which they may change their government. At the antidemocratic extreme of the spectrum are the kind of inherited monarchies that wield absolute unchecked executive power which dominates all aspects of the system (This applies to all the Gulf States, but Saudi Arabia is the supreme example). Not much better are the republican systems in which the voter is offered no realistic choice but to affirm, in a referendum, a single candidate for the presidency, who invariably claims a sweeping victory that approaches unanimity, and then proceeds to rule with near absolute power and without the possibility of his removal by any democratic means (Egypt, Libya, Syria). In effect such rulers behave very much like the inherited monarchies, and frequently far less liberally. Indeed, some are assiduously seeking (and in the case of Syria managed) to have their sons succeed them as presidents (Syria, Libya, Yemen, Egypt). Somewhat better are the dominant party systems (Tunis, Algeria, Yemen, Egypt, Sudan). “Dominant Party” structures permit a margin of freedom for the opposition to campaign, gain seats in legislative bodies, articulate alternative policies, and criticize the government’s performancebut all this only to the extent that stops short of their constituting any real threat or challenge to the group in power. Thus, legislatures are dominated overwhelmingly by the President's party. While in countries such as Jordan, Kuwait and other Gulf States, alliances between the ruling monarchs and traditional tribal chiefs frustrate the efforts of pro-liberal forces to democratize the system. Consequently, in such regimes, there is not the slightest chance that the opposition can come to power, or even gain an effective weight in legislatures to meaningfully influence executive decisions on major public policies.

2. Important indicators of democratic elections is the existence of a mechanism that would reduce flagrant cheating, and the absence of restrictions placed on campaigning, which authoritarian governments impose ostensibly to reduce the risk of violence.

In the final analysis, of course, free and fair elections by themselves have little meaning if those elected do not in practice have the major power in the state to make laws and determine policiesas is the case in all the Arab states, barring none. While no Arab parliament has the major power in the statethat being invariably in the hands of the ruler who wields supreme poweryet in some countries (notably Morocco, Kuwait and Yemen) parliament does play a significant role in modifying legislation proposed by the government and constraining to some degree ministerial power.

3. Some Arab countriesspecifically, Libya and the Gulf statesban political parties altogether. This might lead one to conclude erroneouslythat a fundamental pillar of democracy is missing and hence cannot possibly be established. But in truth there is nothing in democratic theory that mandates the existence of political parties. Indeed the founding fathers of American democracy not only thought that political parties were unnecessary, but strongly believed that they are to be avoided because of the adversarial spirit they give rise to, and their possible corrupting influence on public life on account of their dedication to the acquisition of power. Historical evidence has shown, however, that very small countriessuch as most of the Gulf statesmay still function democratically without political parties through politically oriented associations within civil society. But this is not possible for states with larger populations. However, for the development of a modern state, regardless of size, political parties are essential to permit the necessary aggregation of a large number of votes and the articulation of societal interests, in order to legitimate the proposed alternative policies to those of the ruling group.

4. Public demonstrations and assemblies are essential rights in a free society. Though, there may be occasions when large gatherings could pose a real danger to law and order, yet the ruling elite in the authoritarian Arab regimes usually feel threatened by organized public expressions and use the pretext of their hypothetical danger to suppress them. Lebanon comes first among Arab countries with respect to these freedoms. At the lower end come Egypt, Libya, Syria and Tunis; and worst of all is Saudi Arabia.

5. One cannot begin to speak of a liberal, let alone a democratic, system unless there is an independent judiciary that can be relied on to observe a defendant’s right to due process and a fair trial, and render verdicts with a reasonable degree of impartiality. No Arab regime has a truly independent Judiciary. Most, however, observe a reasonable measure of procedural safeguards in trial cases, except when the charges against the defendant are political in nature. The notable exception is Saudi Arabia in which the entire judicial system fails to even begin to approach the most basic international standards.

6. The right to free association is fundamental to democracy. A measure of the liberalization of a regime is the degree to which free association is permitted without hindrance or restrictions, or control by the government. A dynamic civil society is essential as a bulwark against the natural tendency of governments to accumulate power and their great propensity to encroach on the rights and freedoms of individuals. Here again Lebanon is the freest, and the worst is Saudi Arabia.

7. If religious freedom is essential for the well being of many in the world, it is much more so for the Arab people who, whatever their faith or sect, are generally extremely religious. Moreover, strong religious institutions provide a protective barrier around individuals which governments are usually reluctant to breach. Thus religious organizations represent countervailing power to that of the state. The greatest religious freedoms and least discriminations against religious minorities is in Lebanon, followed by Morocco, Algeria, Syria and Tunis. Ranking poorly are Egypt and Sudan; but the very worst again is Saudi Arabia which prohibits all non-Muslim faiths, and even within Islam tolerates only the Wahhabi version.

Concluding Thoughts
 

Most Arab countries have been living in a state of crisis for at least the last two decades, under authoritarian regimes that precluded any real participation by the people. But in the last three years or so, the Arab world is witnessing the beginnings of a sea change, characterized by an increasing effort at introspection to determine the causes of their malaise. The Arab Human Development Report published annually since 2002 under the auspices of the UNDP is a singularly frank and perceptive example that analyzes the failings, and points the way to overcome them. Although the Report goes into considerable detail in dealing with each problem, the preponderance of the evidence it marshals clearly point that the fundamental cause of the Arab predicament is the failure to establish the institutions of a genuine liberal democracy.

Of equal importance is that the West must maintain a coherent and consistent set of policies towards the Arab countries they wish to help democratize. These policies must strike the proper balance between the two importantand interdependentgoals of stability and the mobilization of civil society to effect democratic reform. Until quite recently the West has favored the first goal to the detriment of the second, with the consequence that many in the Arab world have tended to discount, and to distrust, the democratic rhetoric of the West as merely a vehicle for cynically pursuing its own interests which involve supporting and maintaining the autocratic regimes that have oppressed them for decades.

Of late, however, the West led by the United States has tended to correct this imbalance (between stability and change) by giving greater importance to promoting democracy and exerting greater pressurescoupled with both positive and negative incentiveson Arab governments to undertake meaningful political reform.

No longer are the worn-out excuses of autocratic regimes to delay reform indefinitely acceptable. The claim of exceptionalism of each Arab society, warranting reforms at a glacial pace, and the bogeyman of Islamist fundamentalists coming to power in the wake of significant democratic reform are rejected by both domestic opposition forces and the democratic West.

Indeed, in the case of the U.S. in particular, this stress on the implementation of democracy at a reasonable pace within the Arab world has become a cornerstone of American foreign policy. There can be no doubt that this U.S. stance and its close monitoring of the governments of the region with respect to democratization and respect for individual freedoms has been a major cause for the present vigorous demands for democratic reform within many Arab societies. While all local societal forces disclaim that external pressures have anything to do with their new-founded dynamism and outspokenness in the face of their autocratic rulers, yet there can be no doubt that the existence of that external pressure and the close scrutiny of the behavior of Arab governments by the West has provided for local pro-democratic activistsalthough unacknowledged by themwhat may be called a “safety net.” They now know, albeit often unconsciously, that their dictatorial governments can no longer afford to defy the democratic international community and brazenly suppress their people ruthlessly as they have been doing until lately. This new reality has pervaded the consciousness of opposition forces calling for democracy, and thus helped break down the barrier of fear that has long kept them subdued in the face of outrageously dictatorial regimes.

Thus a new political reality is taking shape in many Arab countries. Pro-democracy activists are becoming more aggressive, speaking more openly and taking to the streets in demonstrations demanding radical changes in terms of democracy and individual freedoms.

On the other hand there have been significant liberal gains in most Arab countries: a greater measure of liberalization that involved greater freedoms of speech and association, yet little has changed in terms of creating stable democratic institutions that would allow the rule of law and the implementation of the will of the people, including that of changing their government.

An impediment that prevents domestic democratic forces from full utilization of Western pressures on Arab governments to effect reform is America’s total support of Israel in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This has led to the perception among many in the Arab world that the conflict is in essence between Muslims and a largely hostile Christian-Jewish West. This has driven a wedge between large segments of the Arab Muslim people and the West, and has caste doubt on the credibility of the West’s, particularly America’s, vehement proclamations of its dedication to the goal of democracy in the Arab world. Unfortunately, this total U.S. bias in favor of Israel has played into the hands of the Islamistswhose commitment to democracy is not above suspicionwho have used this as a rallying cause against the West and its motives in the region. Worse, still, the plight of the Palestinians, coupled with the humiliating developmental failures of the Arab regimes, fuel the recruitment of militant Islamic jihadists.

While the Palestinian problem does not in any way justify the delaying of democracy in the Arab countries, as many of its rulers have tried to do, yet no doubt the settlement of this festering problem for more than three quarters of a century will go a long way to stemming an important source of anti-Western anti-democratic feelings in the Arab world.

Such a settlement will thus open the door for America and Europe to play a vitally effective role in the battle for the hearts and minds of the Arab people in the interest of democracy.
 

Sources and Check List

This report relied heavily on three sources that assessed the status of political rights and civil liberties for different countries in 2004: The Annual Report of the Ibn Khaldun Center in Cairo (in Arabic); the Country Survey of Freedom House; and the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices submitted to the Congress by the U.S. Department of State. Additional data and information was obtained from various newspapers published in the Arab world.

The factors we looked at in each country and tried to report on in order to give a picture of the state of political rights and civil liberties are those in the following Check List.

Check List

For Political Rights and Civil Liberties

(Based on Freedom House Check list)

Political Rights
 

1. Chief authority recently chosen in a free and fair election.

2. Legislature recently elected in a free and fair process

Inferior Alternatives to 1 and 2.

1. Single presidential candidate chosen in referendum with no realistic possibility of rejection

2. Incumbent President running against virtual nonentities and supported by the state apparatus

3. Choice possible only among government-approved candidates

4. Relatively open choices possible only in local elections

5. Open choice possible within a restricted range

1. Fair election laws, campaigning opportunity, polling and tabulation

2. Fair reflection of voter preference in the distribution of power parliament, for example, has effective power

3. Multiple political parties

   • only dominant party allowed effective opportunity

   • open to rise and fall of competing parties

4. Recent shifts in power through elections

5. Significant opposition vote

6. Free of military control

7. Free of foreign control

8. Major group or groups denied reasonable self-determination

9. Informal consensus; de facto opposition power

Civil Liberties

12. Media/literature free of political censorship

    1. Press independent of government

    2. Broadcasting independent of government

13. Open public discussion

14. Freedom of assembly and demonstration

15. Freedom of political or quasi-political organizations

16. Nondiscriminatory rule of law in politically relevant cases:

    1. independent judiciary

    2. security forces respect individuals

17. Free from unjustified political terror or imprisonment

    1. free from imprisonment or exile for reasons of conscience

    2. free from torture

    3. free from terror by state-sponsored militias

    4. free from government-organized terror

18. Free trade unions, peasant organizations, or equivalents

19. Free professional syndicates or other private organizations

20. Free religious institutions and worship

21. Gender equality

22. Freedom from gross government indifference or corruption