Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World. Annual Report. 2004
Published July 2005

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Iraq
 

Capital : Baghdad
Date of Independence : 3/10/1932
Area : 437072 Km
Population (in millions) : 26 (est. 2005)
Rate of Population Increase : 2.7% (est. 2005)
Ethnic Groups : 75-80% Arabs, 15-20% Kurds, 5% Turkmen, Assyrians & others (in 2002)
Religious Groups : 97% Muslims (60-65% Shi’a, 32-37% Sunna) 3% others
Illiteracy : 60%
No. of Provinces : 18 governorates
Polity : Republic
Head of State : Iraqi Interim Government
No. of Political Parties : The “Baath” party was the single ruling party before March 20, 2003. Now tens, but the exact number is unknown.
GDP (in millions)ppp : $89,800 (2004)
GDP per Capitappp : $3,500 (2004)

Overview

Iraq as a state was established in 1921 by a League of Nations mandate to be ruled by a British-installed Hashemite monarchy. It remained a British protectorate until it won independence in 1932. In 1958 a military coup overthrew the regime and killed the royal family, the prime minister and several of the ruling elites. A succession of other coups followed until in 1968 the pan-Arab Baath party seized power and ruled until the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in April 2003, by coalition forces led by the United States. Under U.N Security Council Resolutions 1483, 1500 and 1511 an Interim Administration sponsored by the Coalition Forces was put together as caretaker until sovereignty is assumed by an internationally recognised representative government.

Under Saddam Hussien the minority Arab Sunni regime ruled with an iron fist, suppressing ruthlessly any opposition however mild. In response to Kurdish uprisings in the North demanding an equitable share in the governing of their region Saddam Hussein bombed and gassed entire villages in Kurdistan. The regime also adopted a policy of forced Arabization, expelling Kurds from their homes in districts traditionally part of Kurdistan (like Karkouk) to replace them with Arabs.

The toppling of Saddam’s regime and the occupation of Iraq in March 2003 by the Coalition Forces created a new highly fluid and turbulent situation involving all the ethnic and religious groups of Iraq, as well as gave rise to internal divisions, fostered by ambitions of leadership, within each group, including especially the Shi’a community, which now exhibits three major trends: (i) The conservative right led by Sistani, the most eminent Shi’a cleric in Iraq, which adopts a cautious but cooperative attitude to the Coalition Forces, but would like to see their quick departure; (ii) The revolutionary Shi’a youth, led by the young political ambitious cleric Moktada al-Sadr, who are vehemently against the continued presence of the Coalition Forces; and (iii) The Shi’a allies of the Coalition Forces, which support the latter’s extended stay to help rebuild Iraq. Each of these forces is jockeying for power in anticipation of the withdrawal of the Coalition Forces and the transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqis.
 

I. Political Rights and Civil Liberties

1. The Executive, Political Parties and Elections. The fall of Saddam and the dissolution of his Baathist armed forces and police, left a political vacuum that was filled by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). On June 30^th 2004, the CPA was dissolved transferring power to the 25-member Iraqi Interim Government (ITG), headed by Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, which reflected the relative weight of the various ethnic and religious groupings in Iraq. The ITG arranged for the election of a 275-member National Assembly in January 2005 which would be charged with forming a Transitional Government and drafting a permanent constitution by the end of 2005, to be followed by an election that would install a permanent democratically elected government.

  An escalating insurgency led by a segment of the once dominant Sunni minority created a climate of extreme instability. In order to preserve Iraqi security, Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi announced martial law in June 2004.

  On the 8^th of August 2004, the Iraqi Interim Government re-installed the use of the death penaltywhich had been suspended by the Coalition Provisional Councilin order to combat armed operations against military and civilian targets.

   In November 2004, preparatory phases were underway in anticipation of the Iraqi municipal and parliamentary elections scheduled for the end of January 2005. Elections, which will be based on a “party-list” system, has led to the creation of 216 competing lists. The elections will determine a 275-member National Assembly and the members of eighteen municipal assemblies.

Elections will be taking place in an increasingly unstable environment given the deterioration of the security situation and the mainly Sunni accusations that the planned elections are necessary illegitimate due to the presence of an occupation force and the persistence of emergency laws. The issue of participation in the elections became extremely contentious among the multiple political forces, with most Sunni parties choosing to boycott the elections. On the other hand, most Shi’a parties viewed the elections as a political opportunity and joined Ayatollah Sistani’s United Iraqi Alliance. Kurds also decided to participate in the elections under a united Kurdish Alliance. On the other hand, members of the Interim Government failed to present a united front with the Prime Minister, the ministers, the President and the vice presidents, all running in the elections under competing party lists.

2. The Judiciary, Trials, and Detention. The Iraqi judiciary is not independent although the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), which came into effect on the 8^th of March 2004, stipulates for judicial independence from executive authority and provides the Higher Judicial Council with complete oversight of judicial affairs and budget administration.

  Many human rights organizations, notably Human Rights Watch, reported the continuance of unauthorized arrests of those accused of resistance and terrorism. Those accused of such crimes are generally subjected to inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, to extract confessions. Defendants were often not given a fair trial since frequently trials were too short, lasting no more than 20 minutes, thus raising doubts that the verdicts were pre-determined. Also relatives of those held in custody are rarely given visitation rights.

Since June 2004, the Coalition Forces continued to hold, awaiting trial, many members of the former Baathist regime including the former President Saddam Hussein.

 3. Civil Society: Freedom of Assembly and Association: The TAL allows Iraqi citizens to establish and join non-governmental organizations, except for the Baath party which is banned. It also prohibits all government bodies from interfering in the work of civil society organizations (CSOs) and allows CSOs to collaborate with international organizations. Profiting from this law, the period after the war saw a mushrooming of CSOs. In addition to professional syndicates and human rights organizations, there are currently 132 civil associations in Iraq covering all facets of public life. Despite this notable quantitative increase, Iraqi CSOs suffer from financial and technical shortcoming as well as the turbulent security situation. In order to rectify these shortcomings, the legal, administrative and legislative frameworks need to be reformed. Nonetheless, Iraqi CSOs have been effective, focusing their efforts on the most pressing problems pertaining to the environment, women’s rights, the rehabilitation of the victims of war, the eradication of poverty and unemployment, and the promotion of freedom, democracy and human rights.

In Kurdistan: For the last 13 years Iraqi Kurdistan, under virtual autonomous rule since 1991, and aid provided by the U.S., has shown a remarkable rate of development in both the economic and socio-political domains. In that period of stable autonomous government many important democratic institutions were established and continue to function affectively. Consequently, in Kurdistan civil society has flourished in an environment that permits a very high level of freedom of speech and association as well as an unfettered press.

4. Freedom of Speech and the Media. The TAL lists the freedom of expression as one of the fundamental rights of Iraqi citizens. In the months following the fall of the Baathist regime, 110 new newspapers went into circulation. The only article limiting freedom of expression pertains to a law issued by the CPA prohibiting and punishing the incitement of violence against coalition forces.

  In August 2004, the Arab Organization for the Freedom of the Media condemned Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi’s decision to shut down the Iraqi office of the Jezeera satellite station on grounds that it provokes instability. Moreover, Iraqi Human Rights organizations raised concerns following the suspension of the “Sada Waset” newspaper and the arrest of its editor in chief.

5. Freedom of Religion. Islam is the state religion in Iraq. The previous Baathist restrictions and controls on the freedom of worship of the Shi’a have been lifted. All Iraqis are now free to practice their faith. However, Iraqi Christians have been systematically targeted by an extremist group of Islamists. Published statistics indicate that around 110 Iraqi Christians were killed throughout the past year. In the month of August, four churches were burnt in Mosul and Baghdad. This rising intolerance and violent targeting of the generally middle-class Christian community has led as many as 45,000 Christians (out of a total of 600-700 thousand) to emigrate from Iraq.

6. Women and the Marginalized. Iraqi women are largely educated and capable of taking an effective part in public life encouraged by the explicit policy of the CPA to promote women’s participation. In April 2004, the Interim National Assembly approved the nomination of the first woman deputy minister, with the number eventually reaching seven women. In addition, the Interim Iraqi Government included six women ministers out of the total of 33 ministers. Moreover, women have been successfully elected in a significant number of municipal, city and provincial councils in most Iraqi governorates. For example, women won six seats out of a total of 37 in the Baghdad city council. In addition, the Higher Electoral Committee raised women’s quota in the National Assembly from 25 to 30 percent.

  Women’s Rights groups successfully blocked the passage of IGC’s proposed Law 137 which would have mandated the passage of IGC’s application of Islamic Sharia in personal status cases. However, Iraqi women are often harassed by Islamist groups for not being veiled, and there were several reported cases of forced veiling. Women are also targeted by several armed groups and suffer from risks of kidnapping, rape, and murder.

II. Prospects for Democratic Change
 

It is impossible to speak meaningfully in 2004, after the fall of Saddam, of civil society and democratisation in the absence of the institutions of a stable state with a central government in control of the entire territory of the country. Suffice it to say for now that the toppling of Saddam has opened the door to a new era of political freedoms never seen before in the entire history of Iraq, not to mention the 30-year cruel despotic rule of Saddam Hussein. Tens of political parties have been established, most of which of course are parties in name only; tens of newspapers and magazines are currently in circulation, and freedom of assembly and demonstration are uninhibited. The country, however, is living in a cauldron boiling with the ingredients of sectarian conflict (between Shi’a and Sunni Muslims) and ethnic strife (between Arabs and Kurds and Turkmen). Perhaps the only luminous aspect of Saddam’s regime was its secularism, and its support of women’s freedoms to participate in public life. The present situation carries the dangers of infusing political life with religious dogmaas the Shi’a majority makes ready to take powerwhich will necessarily involve a retraction in women’s rights if fundamentalists assume the upper hand and the traditional laws of Islamic Shari’a come to determine the norms of societal life. In that case, the extent of religious freedoms also will probably be diminished for non-Muslims.