For Middle East Politics Full Circle - Talking Remarks

For Middle Easterners, history never dies or even fades away. From Iraq to Palestine, from Sudan to Afghanistan, the impact of Western colonial legacy of some 200 years back still lives in the collective memories of today’s Middle Easterners. Their grievances, fears, frustration could singularly be traced back to this and that Western power play. Adults and even school children, can easily narrate a litany of unfulfilled Western promises and outright betrayals. It is easy to drown you in our long thick history but let us navigate the short shallow distance of only the last eight decades which will take us right to the very troubled shores of the contemporary Middle East.

I

In last phase of World War I, the two leading powers at the time, Britain and France laid the seeds of all what would become protracted armed conflicts in the region. In 1917, Britain singularly gave the European-based Zionist movement the Balfore Declaration, promising a Jewish Homeland in Palestine which was neither an empty land without people nor even yet occupied by Britain. The native Palestinians were neither consulted nor consented the bitter harvest of the Balfour. Shortly before 1916, the same Britain promised sheriff Hussain of Mecca independence for the Arab countries east of Suez, i.e, Greater Syria including Palestine, Iraq, and Arabia. Meanwhile the same Britain at the same time connived with France to divide up the Arab East (al Mashrik al Arabi). To satisfy their greed, the area was artificially paecelled into five countries: Palestine, Trans- Jordan, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. The first three were to be controlled by Britain and the last two by France. Arabia proper was too barren a desert that neither Britain nor France were interested. It was left to Sherif Hussien as a consolation after the grand betrayal. It was only thirty years later it would turn out that this leftover was laying on the worlds biggest oil reserve and the prize it would unwittingly fall to an American company, ARAMCO.

Some of the bitter harvest of this cynical colonial designs of eighty years ago still reverberates today. The CNN lead newstory for the last few years is either from Palestine (Balfour) or Iraq (Sykes- Picot). Other competing bloody hotspots in the region are Algeria, Sudan and Afghanistan, although not as dramatic for the international media to cover at the same frequency. They are also by-products of the same colonial legacy.

All in all that legacy has left us with the most violence-ridden region in the World today. With less than 7% of World population, the Middle East has appropriated more than 35 % of the world armed conflicts since 1945. it has had the longest protracted conflicts: Palestine 56 years, Sudan 48 years, Iraq 42 years, Somalia 20 years, Lebanon 25 years, Afghanistan 25 years and Algeria 13 years.

These conflicts have sapped tremendous human and material resources in an already poor region: more than 4 million killed, 12 million maimed or wounded, and 20 million uprooted and displaced. A low estimate of the financial costs of these conflicts puts it at US Dollar 6 trillions- i.e 10, 000 $ per capita over the last 50 years. No wonder the 2002 UNDP Arab Human Development Report, (AHDR) noted that despite its natural and human resources, the region has lagged behind the rest of the World in nearly all development indicators. Protracted armed conflicts have been the obvious culprit. But the original sin was committed by Western colonialism.

However, it will be too east to lay the blame at the doors of the West alone. There are other legacies of our creation i.e. home grown. I am referring to a failed liberal legacy; a Middle Eastern autocratic legacy – i.e. a modern version of classical oriental despotism, and finally as Islamic militant legacy. This is was has masqueraded in a variety of “Populisms”, the most known of which are Pan-Arab Nassirism and Baathism. Let us briefly sketch each of these legacies.

II

By the time the colonial legacy was coming to an end in the second quarter of the twentieth century, a Western-oriented upper and middle classes had formed. To be sure the two of them together did not represent more than 10% of the population in their respective Middle East Societies. But for nearly half a century they were the leading actors – first in the strength for independence, then as the new ruling elite in the newly created Middleastern States.

The seeds of these classes were laid during the 19th century. The modern history of them goes back to the 1820s – 1840s in both Egypt, Turkey, Iran, Iraw, and Tunis, when reform-minded rulers sent hundreds of their best and brightest students to Europe to get modern education.

Upon their return, they were put in charge of modern institution-building and managing in their respective countries. Though quite successful at both tasks, their promising modernizing project was pre-maturely halted or altogether aborted by the colonial conquest of their countries at various points of the 19th century. However, these newly formed classes would continue their socio-cultural influence as mediators and advocates of Western liberal values. They were the epitome of, and the driving force of what Hisham Sharaby called the “Arab Liberal Age”, which roughly extended from the mid-19th to the mid-20th century. They led the struggle for independence and tried to transplant liberal democratic institutions: free press, modern constitutions, electoral politics, multiparty systems, and Western-type Parliaments.

But again this promising political experiment would come to an end in most Middleastern countries by the early 1950s. In their moment of enthusiasm the Arab liberals raised expectations and promised for more than they were able to deliver. Their ultimate discrediting, however, was because of the first Arab defeat at the hands of the newly established Jewish state of Israel in 1948. First in Syria (1949) then in Egypt (1950), Iraq (1958) the returning army officers wound stage coup d'états, overthrowing the civilian liberal government which they held responsible for their humiliating debacle in Palestine.

From that point (1948) on, Israel would become a salient factor in Middle Eastern politics. Challenging it, and defeated by it would become a pattern or regime change at least in the Arab countries.

III

Arab populism dominated the political landscape in the Middle East for the last fifty years.

With a secular, modernist, nationalist, and qirasi-socialist outlook, Arab populism propagated an ideological mixture which was initially appealing to a vast majority of hitherto disenfranchised, but growing, urban population. Sociologically, these were categories which were newcomers from the countryside to Middle Eastern cities in search of education, work and fortune during the inter-war period – i.e. 1920’s – 1940’s. As the short-lived Middle Eastern Liberal Age disappointed them, this growing urban mass was in search for new alternatives to fulfill its frustrated aspirations. The populist regimes came to power through military coup d’etat carried out by young officers of the newly created armies. Descendants, relatives, and neighbors of the disenfranchised urban classes, the young officers felt their aspirations and frustrations. They spoke a simple political language which responded to such yearnings. The new officers – rulers – ideologes promised everything under the sun to their real or virtual constituencies of middle, lower-middle, and under-classes: national dignity, social justice, rapid economic development, unification of the Homeland, and the liberation of Palestine. There was one small thing missing from this fabulous list of desirables – i.e. liberal democracy. Even that was a delayed promise by the new rulers. It was to come after all the other desirables were fulfilled – i.e. the icing on the cake. This trade-off came to be known as the “populist social contract” (PDC). Egypt’s Nasser was the arch-type populist social contractor. With an added charisma of his own, Nasser managed to mobilize the masses behind the PSC. In his early years he in fact delivered on a number of close desirables – e.g. forced the British out of Egypt, nationalized the Suez Canal, built the High Aswan Dam, instituted a land reform scheme for poor peasants, gave Egyptians and Arabs a sense of dignity on the international stage by asserting an autonomous foreign policy for Non-Alignment between the West and the Soviets.

Nasser’s PSC seemed so attractively successful at the time (i.e. the 1950’s and 60’s) that he was to be widely emulated in the region and the Third World at large – e.g. Syria’s Assad, Algeria’s Boumadienne, Libya’s Qaddafy, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, Yemen’s Saleh, and Sudan’s Bashir.

However, the politics of the PSC came to a halt with the 1967 defeat in the six-day-war. With the proponent regimes’ discredited, politics of populist mobilization gave way to politics of repression and control in the name of state national security.

In effect it was basically regime-security. High on repression and low on achievements, these regimes’ legitimacy or what was left of it further eroded. A new phase of adventurism was soon to become a regional way of life: Syria’s Assad gets involved in Lebanon; Libya’s Qaddafy in Chade; Algeria’s Boumedienne in the Western Sahara, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in Iran and Kuwait. Some of these regional adventures invariably escalated to international crises; thus bringing back big colonial powers, old and new, back into the region. That is the blood mess the Middle East is in at present. At this writing (October 2003) Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon have foreign forces stationed or fighting on their territories – from the U.S., Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Poland, Australia and others.

IV

With the eroding legitimacy and the discrediting of populist regimes, an Islamic alternative has gradually emerged since the late 1960’s. Inheriting some of the populist impulses mainly for social justice, anti-zionist and anti-Western, this Islamic alternative has equally inherited some of the populist constituencies, old and new. In fact, the dis-possessed in Middle Eastern cities had more than tripled during the first quarter century of populist politics (1950 – 1975). The 1979 Iranian Revolution has initially made the Islamic alternative both real and attractive. Its proponents grew in numbers and militancy during the 1970’s, 1980’s and 1990’s. Even though have not managed to seize power in many countries, Islamic activists have managed to make their presence forcefully felt on the national, regional and international stage.

Beyond Iran, Islamic activists led an anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan (1979-1990); assassinated Egyptian President Sadat for making peace with Israel (1981) and confronted his successor, President Mubarak, for the following two decades; managed to drive Israeli occupation out of South Lebanon (Hizbullah, 2000), and engaged Israeli occupation forces in Palestine in a lethal struggle (Hamas and Jihad in the last decade). We know too well what some of them did in the U.S. on 9/11.

But Islamic activism has not been all violence. Some of its advocates have chosen to engage in electoral politics as usual – e.g in Turkey, Morocco, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, and Yemen.

It is this democratically disposed faction of Islamic activists which offer the best promise for the overall peaceful transformation of the region. There is a reasonable argument that representatives of this faction in different Middle Eastern countries could evolve into Muslims democratic parties, akin to their counterparts in Western Europe – i.e. Christian Democrats.

Curiously enough, some of the old populist crowd – e.g. Nasserites, Baathists and Marxists have equally converted to pluralistic politics. They joined fronts and coalitions advocating constitutional and political reforms in their respective countries.

V

The tramatic events of 9/11 and its unfolding aftermath, i.e. the war in Afghanistan and Iraq, have impacted the entire world. The Middle East has been the focal zone of those events – both as cause and effect. Political Islam has become a pressing concern to us all on both sides of the Atlantic.

To Islamic activists “Islam” as they understand is The Solution for the ills of Muslim societies and the world at large. As they understand it, Islam is a complete and perfect way of life. It regulates all human affairs – from interpersonal to international relations. Observing its teachings ensures the faithful virtuous, dignified, and prosperous life here on Earth and to an eternal bliss in Heaven.

Tens of millions of Muslims around the world, from Indonesia to Morocco share this belief.

But only few millions are disposed to act on it as a program of political action.
And fewer of those, i.e. in only the thousands, are disposed to using violent means to bring about that Islamic vision into effect. These are the Islamic Militants, the Jehadies.

Though a very tiny of minority (of less than one million) out of the World’ Muslim population (of 1,300 millions), the Jihadi’s Militants have dominated the network news in recent years.

Their relationship with the West, and especially the U.S. has been quite mercurial. It was not always hostile as many Americans now think. As a matter of fact they were viewed by top American policy makers as actual and virtual allies against communism. As recently as the 1980’s and 1990’s, Islamic militant leaders were being warmly received in the White House, State Department, and the CIA – i.e. in the hay days of resisting the Soviets in Afghanistan.

But with the end of the Cold War, there were no more need for them – either ideologically or as armed fighters. It was the end of a honey moon of sorts.

However, the Jehadi militants were not finished with their agenda, even if America was finished with hers. They tried to take over power in a score of Muslim Countries – namely Egypt, Saudi Arabia. They were resisted by regimes allied to the U.S.