The battle for change in the Arab world is waged by indigenous as well as external forces; and by millions of ordinary faceless Arab men and women from Iraq to Morocco. But as usual, the role of leaders?some already in power and some in waiting?will be decisive in determining the outcome. The horrific events of 9/11 and subsequent developments from Afghanistan to Palestine to Iraq have added heat to an already boiling Arab-Muslim-World. All leaders are feeling the heat from within and without, though each are reacting to it differently. At the risk of over-simplification, the Arab world can be seen as currently dominated by an authoritarian core of states whose leaders are resistant to change?symbolized by Saudi King Fahd, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and Syrian President Assad. However, there is also a periphery made up of smaller states, that show signs of responsiveness to change?symbolized by Morocco’s king Mohamed VI, Qatar’s ruler and his wife, Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa and Shikha Moza Bin Nasser al-Musned, and Oman’s Sultan Qabus.

King Fahd of Saudi Arabia is over 80 years old, and the five successors (brothers and half brothers) in line for the throne are all in their late seventies. Similarly, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak is in his late seventies, but intends to run unopposed for a fifth six-year term, becoming the third longest ruler in the country’s five thousand years of recorded history. Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi has completed 35 years as the absolute ruler of his country. Tunisia’s General Zein Al Abdeen Bin Ali just got himself re-elected, virtually unopposed, for a fourth five-year term. The same applies to Sudan’s Marshal Omar Bashir, who came to power in a military coup in 1989, and Yemen’s Ali Abdulla Saleh who also came to power through a coup in early 1980s.

Until his fall in April 2003, Saddam Hussein’s regime was the core of the core of authoritarianism in the Arab world. Intimidation, coercion, and elimination have been standard methods of these authoritarian states in dealing with dissent. Annals of Amnesty International document torture as well as forced disappearance as routine practices. The Iraq dissident Kanaan Makayia in his widely acclaimed book, Republic of Fear, detailed the thousand-and-one ways of frightening a whole nation into submission.

Syria is an anomaly of sorts among the other tyrannically-ruled Arab countries, in which heads of states are somewhere between 65 and 85 years old. The late Hafez al Assad ruled Syria for over thirty years before passing the presidency to his son Bashar al-Assad in 2000. Though still at the young age of 39, Bashar al-Assad inherited his father’s inner circle of aids who are all in their late sixties and seventies. The early promises of change and opening the country to the 21st century have been dashed. It turned out that the President may be young but the Syrian leadership is as old as its counterparts in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. An oligarchy of kin, friends and ideological comrades are in total control of the armed forces, intelligence, secret police, public finance, and the mass media.

One thing characterizing most authoritarian states of the Arab World is grooming the sons of aging leaders for succession. An early preview of this was the Assad father-son succession in Syria in 2000. The same scenario was set to take place in Iraq, before the fall of Saddam Hussein in April 2003. The scenario is still anticipated in Yemen, Libya, and Egypt. As republics, these countries’ rulers have to engage in extensive maneuvering to ensure passing down power to one of their children within the trappings of formal legitimacy. Securing the support of the armed forces and internal security agencies is a must, followed by other institutional and popular endorsements.

In Syria, the would-be presidential son was commissioned to a high ranking army command and surrounded by other relatives in key positions. The same measures are emulated in Yemen and Libya. In Egypt, there is a notable variation. Mubarak’s son Gamal has shown no interest in an army career, so the family opted for a political party career. Three years ago, Gamal Mubarak was appointed by his father to head the newly-established Policies Committee of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). He wasted no time, as this Committee quickly emerged as the brain and the muscles of the NDP. By 2004, Gamal has become a power broker. In a new government, named mid-year, eight key ministers came from the Policies Committee and are known to be his close associates.

On paper, Gamal Mubarak may be as best qualified as any Egyptian on the scene to become the next president. But all opposition parties and major civil society organizations made it clear in recent declarations that they vehemently object to both the father running for a fifth term (due in October 2005) and to young Mubarak’s slipping into the office, Syrian style. Some of them made it equally clear that should their long standing demand for constitutional amendments be honored, in return they may support the candidacy of either Mubarak. The amendments in question have to do with maximum term limits of one six-year or two-five year terms, in direct competitive elections (instead of the current referendum on one person). The current practice is an indirect candidacy, whereby the People’s Assembly nominates one person whose name then is voted on by “yes” or “no” in a plebiscite. With the results always in the neighborhood of 99.0% “yes.” So repugnant, the practice has become a butt of jokes by Egyptians who had long stopped taking it seriously. Nevertheless, regime insiders are busy marketing young Mubarak to the West, especially the U.S. to which he has already visited several times in recent years, making the round to any influential door that would open. The regime argue that should Egypt seriously democratize with fair and open elections, the Islamists will win. Hence the status quo is best for Egypt, the region, and the West. The contend that Young Mubarak with his liberal ideas for economic reform and conservative authoritarian politics is the best guarantee for continuity and stability.

Libya’s Muammar Quaddafi has already made a series of significant strategic retreats to appease former detractors, reconcile with Europe and the U.S. His son Seif al-Islam is reported to be the architect of this turn around in Libyan foreign policy. Educated at the London School of Economics, his prominence in Libyan politics skyrocketed after 9/11 and the fall of Saddam Hussein. With Libya’s vast oil and proximity, European interlocutors have been swift in reciprocating. The U.K., France, Germany, and Italy are racing to do business with Libya in non-oil fields as well. Though dramatic, this change in foreign policy has hardly imparted domestically-tight control and repression continue as usual.

Though belonging to the authoritarian core states, Yemen has significantly distanced itself from them since 9/11 and the fall of Saddam. It offered full cooperation with the U.S. in the war on terrorism. Unlike his peers elsewhere, the Saleh regime introduced several internal reforms, conducted parliamentary elections with international observers on the scene, allowed greater freedom of the media, and unequivocally welcomed reform initiatives from abroad, including the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) Initiative adopted last June by the Group of Eight. The grooming of young Ahmed A. Saleh seems further down the road to materialization than his peers in Libya and Egypt, though Yemen has a potentially tougher tribal scene that must be accommodated. Son Ahmed commands the special anti-terrorism force, which is a match for the Yemeni army, but with better training and equipments.

While some authoritarian core regimes were lurching toward change, led by sons who bring new style if not substance; something more interesting was developing at the periphery of the Arab world.

Well before the fall of Saddam Hussein, an interesting set of young monarchs already had recognized the dire need for modernization and democratic governance. At the geographic periphery of the Arab world, kings, sultans, and Sheikhs began moving steadily toward peaceful change. Morocco, Jordan, Oman, Bahrain, and Qatar are evolving into constitutional monarchies. Elected parliaments which hold the top executive accountable are either already in place or under way in those countries. Morocco’s King Mohamed VI and Qatar’s Sheikh Hamad are cases in point. At the far east and far west of the Arab world, both monarchs are young and western-educated. Not only are they leading the region in political democratization, but also overseeing a revolutionary social transformation of their societies.

In December 2003, the Moroccan King proposed to his parliament a bill providing for full gender equality in all aspects of life. This new bill of rights exceeds even the most ardent Moroccan feminists’ hopes and has put Morocco ahead of Egypt and Tunisia in the Arab world, and on a par with Turkey in the larger Muslim world. Having inherited a heavy legacy of human rights violations from his father, the late Hassan II, King Mohamed VI initiated a National Commission for Fairness and Reconciliation (NCFR). Modeled after Nelson Mandela’s Commission for Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa after the fall of the apartheid regime, Morocco’s NCFR is to reopen and investigate all grievances, try those responsible, and repatriate victims and next of kin. An equally far-reaching measure is lifting state censorship and privatizing Moroccan radio and television. Thus, Morocco is carrying out what Farid Zakryia has long argued for in this magazine?i.e. social liberalization along with electoral democracy. Zakriya is apprehensive lest the latter brings to power non-democratic radicals of a militant Islamist variety. If anything, King Mohamed VI put that fear to rest. In the November 2002 parliamentary elections, the Islamic-based Justice and Development Party (JDP) came third among more than 10 competing political parties. And like their Turkish counterparts, Morocco’s JDP deputies have been quite responsible and dignified.

At the other end of the Arab world, Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa of Qatar has earned much notoriety by allowing his tiny Gulf State to host the al-Jazeera satellite television Station Channel in 1996. Since then al-Jazeera has become the single most important factor in opening up and expanding public space in the Arab world. Its free-wheeling debates, talk shows, and daring news coverage have energized Arab intelligentsia, and empowered ordinary Arab citizens who can call in and express themselves freely. Many other radio and TV stations followed suit. Sheikha Moza, Qatar’s First Lady, has demolished the traditional stereotype of a veiled submissive Arab women. Articulate, outspoken and multilingual, Sheikha Moza has pushed the cause for gender equality to the utmost. She presides over a network of world-class centers of excellence in all fields of knowledge and advanced technology. Under the Qatar Foundation, she has made it possible, on competitive basis to complete globally for Qataris and other Arabs. There seems almost to be a benign competition between this husband and wife in a race for political democratization and social transformation in the desert Sheikhdom. Their latest project is the Doha Debates, in which public issues are methodically debated by opposing teams before a live audience of Qatari college students, who vote at the end on which side has won the debate. To assure quality and substance, the Doha Debates are modeled after the Oxford Union, and moderated by the well known Timothy Sebastian of BBC’s Hard Talk. The Doha Debates promise to be no less revolutionary than al-Jezeera, both of which are doing so much to liberate so many Arabs that they infuriorate their tyrannical neighbors. It may be argued that a country like Qatar with its small population and bountiful oil wealth can afford to undertake such daring and costly ventures. The counter argument, however, is that the same country with the same demographic and economic base, under a previous aging leadership did nothing of the sort. Likewise, countries with several times larger populations and a fraction of Qatar’s wealth, have managed to be as daring in moving forward with a radical reform agenda, such as Morocco, Jordan, Oman, and Bahrain. Therefore, it must be the mind set, generation, and quality of education of the leadership of each country which make the difference.