Report on
The State of Basic Freedoms in Egypt
July 18, 2004
1. It must be said at the outset that the state of basic freedoms
in Egypt is significantly better than in most of its Arab and Middle
Eastern neighbors. But it is still far below that in Western democracies
as well as below that of some other Third World democracies like
India, Indonesia, Senegal and Morocco.
2. Egypt still has some saving graces from its liberal legacy of
the last century?notably an autonomous judiciary in most levels
of litigation, and an independent High Court of Cassation. It was
the latter that finally struck down two previous rulings by a State
Security Court in the Ibn Khaldun Case (sentencing its Chairman
to 7 years at hard labor). True, it took nearly three years before
the case was finally appealed and retried by Cassation. But the
final acquittal not only spared the accused four more years behind
bars, but also asserted some fundamental rights for Egyptian civil
society. Thanks to this landmark ruling, Ibn Khaldun Center was
able to reopen its doors, resume its agenda on the third anniversary
of its closure by Egypt’s State Security Agency (SSA) on June
30th, 2003; and today receive this distinguished Congressional delegation.
3. The state of basic freedoms in Egypt is substantially flawed
leaving much to be desired. Within such general flaw, the rights
of religious minorities and other vulnerable groups are even more
abridged. Egypt’s biggest religious minority, Coptic Christians
(some 10% of the population about 7 millions) continues to complain
about deliberate or defacto discrimination. A recent editorial,
in their main weekly publication, Watani, July 11, 2004 listed several
examples of the authorities refusing or stalling requests for building
and/or remodeling churches, especially in the upper Egyptian governorate
of Assiut. The same editorial takes issue with a statement made
by the Muslim Grand Mofti, Dr. Aly Gomaa, that “the claim
that Christians in Egypt have any problems was groundless”
(copy attached).
4. There are three contrarian “mind-sets” in public
Egyptian discourse about the issue of religious freedoms. The official
governmental mind-set which claim and probably believes that all
basic freedoms are respected; and if there were any exceptions,
it is “only those extremists, deviants, and heretics whose
exercise of freedom would threaten public order and /or create sedition
(fitnah) in society.” Minority communities mind-set is quite
alert, sensitive, and clamoring at any act of discrimination slight
or major. The Muslim majority mind-set which has been tuned to believe
the governmental claim about absence of discrimination vis-à-vis
the Copts, though hardy believe the government on a host of other
domestic and external issues. The Mofti’s statement above
is symptomatic of this majority’s mind-set.
5. The Egyptian government mind-set about religious freedom is rooted
in a culture of shame and denial. This is extreme embarrassment
when one of its repugnant practices is publicly exposed. Its disposition
is initially one of utter denial. If the exposure persists, then
it is attributed to a “conspiracy” by enemies or detractors
of Egypt abroad and their clients at home. Thus the other side of
the culture of shame and denial is conspiracy theories.
6. At the root of all the above is the absence of an open society,
transparency, and democracy. Such absence impedes reality-checking
through objective research, public opinion polling, free professional
media and investigative reporting. With the exception of a 1971
parliamentary debate about a minor sectarian incident (Khanka) the
People’s Assembly and the Shura Council (an upper House) have
never debated minorities’ concerns, even when there were major
sectarian incidents (1998-2000 in El-Koshoh).
7. What applies to the Christian Copts is true to a great extent
to three other religious minority groups: the Muslim Shias, Bahais,
and Christian Jehovas Witness. What makes the matter worse for these
are two additional reasons. First, their numbers are tiny and hence
condemned to socio-religious insignificance. Second, they are subject
to further discrimination from major sects of the same religion,
occasionally using the power of the State to eliminate them or keep
them in check?i.e. Bishop Ikram Lamie denounces Jehovas Witness
as “non-Christians” (Al-Masry al-You, July 18, 2004).
8. Removing the issue of religious freedoms (or the lack of it)
from public debate is due to a ban by the State Security Agency
(SSA) which considers the matter its own responsibility with total
monopoly of jurisdiction. So long as the President continues to
grant the SSA such powers, the issue will remain inflammable and
locked into the same vicious cycle of the three contrarian mind-sets
referred to in (4) above. The whole file should be handed by an
independent ecumenical body attached to the Presidency.
9. The issue of religious freedoms could not and ought not be treated
piecemeal; nor should it be dealt with separately from the bigger
issue of basic freedoms and human rights as enunciated in the universal
Declaration and other Human Rights Covenants, to which Egypt is
signatory. The problem is one of respecting the spirit, enforcing
the letter of these international documents, proper qualified agency
of jurisdiction, and public accountability at home and abroad.
10. The Egyptian Constitution must be amended in accordance with
the consensus of the demands made by opposition parties, civil society
organizations, and the Committee of Defense of Democracy (CDD)?mainly
open competitive presidential elections for no more than two successive
terms, freedom and privatization of the media; freedom to establish
political parties and associations; freedom to profess and practice
any religion. The latter amendment puts an end to the current practice
of naming a religion for the state or giving it the authority to
determine what is proper and what is heretical religious or sects.
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