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Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim's Articles

Report on
The State of Basic Freedoms in Egypt


July 18, 2004


1. It must be said at the outset that the state of basic freedoms in Egypt is significantly better than in most of its Arab and Middle Eastern neighbors. But it is still far below that in Western democracies as well as below that of some other Third World democracies like India, Indonesia, Senegal and Morocco.

2. Egypt still has some saving graces from its liberal legacy of the last century?notably an autonomous judiciary in most levels of litigation, and an independent High Court of Cassation. It was the latter that finally struck down two previous rulings by a State Security Court in the Ibn Khaldun Case (sentencing its Chairman to 7 years at hard labor). True, it took nearly three years before the case was finally appealed and retried by Cassation. But the final acquittal not only spared the accused four more years behind bars, but also asserted some fundamental rights for Egyptian civil society. Thanks to this landmark ruling, Ibn Khaldun Center was able to reopen its doors, resume its agenda on the third anniversary of its closure by Egypt’s State Security Agency (SSA) on June 30th, 2003; and today receive this distinguished Congressional delegation.

3. The state of basic freedoms in Egypt is substantially flawed leaving much to be desired. Within such general flaw, the rights of religious minorities and other vulnerable groups are even more abridged. Egypt’s biggest religious minority, Coptic Christians (some 10% of the population about 7 millions) continues to complain about deliberate or defacto discrimination. A recent editorial, in their main weekly publication, Watani, July 11, 2004 listed several examples of the authorities refusing or stalling requests for building and/or remodeling churches, especially in the upper Egyptian governorate of Assiut. The same editorial takes issue with a statement made by the Muslim Grand Mofti, Dr. Aly Gomaa, that “the claim that Christians in Egypt have any problems was groundless” (copy attached).

4. There are three contrarian “mind-sets” in public Egyptian discourse about the issue of religious freedoms. The official governmental mind-set which claim and probably believes that all basic freedoms are respected; and if there were any exceptions, it is “only those extremists, deviants, and heretics whose exercise of freedom would threaten public order and /or create sedition (fitnah) in society.” Minority communities mind-set is quite alert, sensitive, and clamoring at any act of discrimination slight or major. The Muslim majority mind-set which has been tuned to believe the governmental claim about absence of discrimination vis-à-vis the Copts, though hardy believe the government on a host of other domestic and external issues. The Mofti’s statement above is symptomatic of this majority’s mind-set.

5. The Egyptian government mind-set about religious freedom is rooted in a culture of shame and denial. This is extreme embarrassment when one of its repugnant practices is publicly exposed. Its disposition is initially one of utter denial. If the exposure persists, then it is attributed to a “conspiracy” by enemies or detractors of Egypt abroad and their clients at home. Thus the other side of the culture of shame and denial is conspiracy theories.

6. At the root of all the above is the absence of an open society, transparency, and democracy. Such absence impedes reality-checking through objective research, public opinion polling, free professional media and investigative reporting. With the exception of a 1971 parliamentary debate about a minor sectarian incident (Khanka) the People’s Assembly and the Shura Council (an upper House) have never debated minorities’ concerns, even when there were major sectarian incidents (1998-2000 in El-Koshoh).

7. What applies to the Christian Copts is true to a great extent to three other religious minority groups: the Muslim Shias, Bahais, and Christian Jehovas Witness. What makes the matter worse for these are two additional reasons. First, their numbers are tiny and hence condemned to socio-religious insignificance. Second, they are subject to further discrimination from major sects of the same religion, occasionally using the power of the State to eliminate them or keep them in check?i.e. Bishop Ikram Lamie denounces Jehovas Witness as “non-Christians” (Al-Masry al-You, July 18, 2004).

8. Removing the issue of religious freedoms (or the lack of it) from public debate is due to a ban by the State Security Agency (SSA) which considers the matter its own responsibility with total monopoly of jurisdiction. So long as the President continues to grant the SSA such powers, the issue will remain inflammable and locked into the same vicious cycle of the three contrarian mind-sets referred to in (4) above. The whole file should be handed by an independent ecumenical body attached to the Presidency.

9. The issue of religious freedoms could not and ought not be treated piecemeal; nor should it be dealt with separately from the bigger issue of basic freedoms and human rights as enunciated in the universal Declaration and other Human Rights Covenants, to which Egypt is signatory. The problem is one of respecting the spirit, enforcing the letter of these international documents, proper qualified agency of jurisdiction, and public accountability at home and abroad.

10. The Egyptian Constitution must be amended in accordance with the consensus of the demands made by opposition parties, civil society organizations, and the Committee of Defense of Democracy (CDD)?mainly open competitive presidential elections for no more than two successive terms, freedom and privatization of the media; freedom to establish political parties and associations; freedom to profess and practice any religion. The latter amendment puts an end to the current practice of naming a religion for the state or giving it the authority to determine what is proper and what is heretical religious or sects.

 
 

 
 
   
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