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2004
I must grudgingly confess that President George W. Bush’s
speech on November 6th in the National Endowment for Democracy was
a pleasant surprise. As a life-long advocate of democracy in the
Arab World, I could not have written a better speech. The genuine
Arab democrats, a small minority to start with, have for many years
felt lonely in the despotic wilderness of the Middle East. This
was not so much for lack of those yearning for liberal governance,
but from fears of publicly expressing those yearnings.
When the Iraqi dissident Kana’an Mekiyya published his book,
Republic of Fear (1991), he was not just describing the one thousand
and one ways by which Saddam Hussein subdued the entire people of
Iraq into submission. Mekiyya was in fact depicting the general
features of a widespread modern-day oriental despotism in the Arab
World. Peoples of Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria,
and Sudan may have not have been as physically brutalized as the
Iraqis, but a deep-rooted fear was and still is prevalent among
them. The difference is one of degree.
When I was incarcerated along with 27 young associates of the Ibn
Khaldun Center three years ago by Egypt’s regime, most intellectuals
and civil society activists in the country were paralyzed with fear
and apprehension for many months. It was mainly international civil
society and the media in democratic countries that kept up the pressure
until our acquittal on all charges by Egypt’s highest court.
The unusually lengthy 35-page court ruling went out of its way to
condemn the Egyptian regime for having fabricated the case with
trumped up charges, in order to silence the Center and end its irksome
activities.
More importantly for the theme of this essay, the court had scathing
criticism of the regime for steadily encroaching on the judiciary
and the legislature, thus undermining the spirit of the rule of
law. This is a bold statement, coming in the face of two seven-
year prison sentences handed down in previous rulings by State Security
Courts. (The latter were established under Emergency Law, passed
in the aftermath of the assassination of President Sadat in 1981.)
Emergency law gives the state sweeping powers of administrative
detention and the suspension of due process; and enabled the creation
of State Security Courts, which are not bound by the internationally
recognized standards for fair trials.
Emergency Law may be justified in a moment of crisis – such
as that in 1981 when the head of the State (President Sadat) had
just been assasinated by an Islamic militant group. However, the
Mubarak regime has kept the Emergency Law in effect for the ensuing
22 years. For the first twenty years it justified that lengthy extension
claiming the need to combat Islamic extremists. After 9/11, the
Egyptian government renewed the Law for three additional years,
under the pretext of being part of the U.S. led coalition of the
war on terrorism. The fact of the matter is that the Mubarak regime
has used Emergency Law against peaceful political dissidents of
all persuasions. Ours was a dramatic case in point.
In fairness, Egypt still has a modicum of civility. Its highest
Court of Cassation is truly independent, with judges elected for
life by their peers. It is one of the few surviving features of
that Liberal Age in Egypt which flourished from 1922 to 1952. It
is true that it took three years of successive trials and incarceration
before our case was definitively reviewed by the Court of Cassation,
but we were confident that once there, we would get a fair hearing.
This is yet to be the case for an estimated 15,000 political prisoners
in Egyptian jails – some of whom have been detained for 14
years or more without charges or trial. Egypt’s Court of Cassation
is a saving grace for curbing the excesses of the state. Unfortunately,
this is not the case in most other Arab countries. Political dissidents
too often simply disappear within the draconian systems wielded
by these authoritarian regimes.
For years Arab democrats have been dancing alone and without music.
President Bush’s Nov. 6 speech at least provided some warm-up
to the band. Dissidents are beginning to speak a little louder.
They feel a long overdue recognition. As President Bush himself
admitted, cold war and geopolitical considerations made the US dance
all too often with Arab dictators, to the tune of the status quo.
Arab dictators, through their state-controlled media, dismissed
the Bush speech as hypocritical and arrogant: it merely revealed
the US double standards. They are quick to deflect attention from
their own dismal records to conflicts elsewhere. Thus, the acid
test of US sincerity is a fair resolution of the Palestinian question
and/or immediate withdrawal from Iraq. This plays to popular and
legitimate demands of the Arab people, but for ulterior motives.
A review of this dismissive commentary reveals that the authors
are a curious mix of old Marxists, Nasserites, Baaathists, and Islamicists.
Despite differences among them on a number of issues, their common
discourse has not changed much since the 1950’s. Its themes
are anti-imperialism, anti-capitalism, anti-Zionism, anti-Western,
and in particular, anti-American. Though clearly anti-democratic
as well, they have opted not to declare such hostility outright
explicitly or upfront. Instead, they begin by alleging that any
Arab voice that calls for regime change now is playing into a nefarious
American agenda in the Middle East. Then the allegation extends
to any voice that calls for change in any sphere of life –
labeling them “cultural agents” of a hegemonic America.
Since the war in Iraq and the quest for its democratization, Arab
democrats have become favorite targets for that broad anti-democratic
coalition.
A sample of this tarring and feathering (blended with conspiracy
theories) of the advocates of a genuine democracy is illuminating.
This author was recently on a lecture tour in the US which included
Seattle (University of Washington, my alma matter), Anchorage (Middle
East Studies Association annual meeting), and Atlanta (a Carter
Center conference on Human Rights defenders). The tour was set up
months ago, and had not initially included Washington D.C. or meetings
with any American official in or out of the White House. The coincidence
of President Bush’s speech with my presence in the US, however,
caused the yellow press in Egypt to go wild. The al-Osbou’
Weekly, a reputed mouthpiece of the State Security Agency, credited
me as the unseen force behind the speech. It alleged that the US
Congress subsequently rewarded me by appropriating several million
dollars to my Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies (Al Osbou,
Nov. 17th, 2003). The front page headline read: “Saad in Washington
to incite the US against Egypt and the Arab World”. This baseless
story was later reprinted in several Arab newspapers (al-Arabi,
Nov. 15th; el-Midan, Nov. 16th).
Demagoguery aside, there is valid apprehension among genuine Arab
democrats about whether the US is serious about supporting their
efforts toward overdue democratic transformation of their countries.
And if so, how is the US going to go about it—helpful encouragement
or heavy-handed interference?
The image problem that the US has at present is due to a lingering
war in Iraq and close association with Ariel Sharon. The US appears
to give unconditional support to a prime minister in Israel who
has been universally disliked across the Arab world, not least because
of war-crimes committed in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camp massacres
in 1982. This negativity is compounded by the long history of US
duplicity with Arab, Middle East, and Third World tyrants. Most
genuine Arab democrats do not hold present-day Americans accountable
for previous historical sins, but they find themselves constantly
forced to expend meager resources explaining that those sins do
not necessarily have to be repeated.
Arab democrats recognize that US success in Iraq would strengthen
their own democratic quests elsewhere in the region. They wish the
US had planned more wisely for post-war Iraq, as it meticulously
planned to destroy Saddam. It should have consulted more closely
with Arab and Iraqi democratic forces in the region. It should not
have so quickly dissolved the Iraqi army, which was as alienated
from Saddam Hussein as the rest of the Iraqis. The army's discontent
was rooted in being treated as a third-class military service, after
the Republican Guards and the Special Republican Guard Units. It
is from the ranks of the last two that much of the current Iraqi
resistance to the American-led coalition comes.
But it is never too late to admit mistakes and move forward. Arab
legal, economic and political advisors from civil society around
the region could be called upon to work with local counterparts
toward reconstructing Iraq. Security could be improved by reconstituting
units and brigades of the old Iraqi Army. With short re-training
such elements can expedite the transition to a stable and democratic
Iraq.
Those who wish for American failure in Iraq are much the same unholy
alliance of anti-democratic groups: Arab tyrants, old leftists,
Baathists, and Nasserites. These spent forces recognize on some
level that history has finally turned against them. The graphic
fall of Saddam’s statue was a moment of truth for them. An
American failure in Iraq would give them a new lease, albeit a short
one, on life.
Unfortunately a regional democratic coalition is yet to emerge,
although its constituent elements are all there though widely scattered.
Arab regimes have long put them in prison or under permanent siege.
The community of older democracies can definitely lend a hand to
lift that siege by demanding a greater margin of freedom. They can
do so by providing interaction with democracy advocates in Eastern
Europe and elsewhere who successfully defied their own despots.
Funds, travel opportunities and training are all welcome. Similar
post-Helsinki support in the 1970’s and 80’s hastened
peaceful democratic transformations of governance across the former
Soviet Union.
The US will be well advised to go multilateral in the Middle East.
The active involvement of midium-size and smaller powers with no
colonial record in the region, e.g. the Scandinavian and Canadians,
can make the call for democratization less suspect. It was the dogged
US unilateralism in Iraq that alienated many of its European allies
and embittered Arabs. The US can and will still lead the effort
for reconstruction, stabilization and democratization in Iraq –they
have the military power and wealth to do so. But actively welcoming
others from the community of democracies to join in the Iraq project
would ward off much of the allegations of a sinister American design
to rob Iraq of its oil, or to consolidate US imperial hegemony.
Along the same line, it will help both the US and the indigenous
Arab democrats if a time-table for transferring power to Iraqis
is declared and adhered to faithfully. The recent indications from
Washington to this effect must be widely publicized in Iraq and
the region at large.
In Europe, much of the doubt cast on America’s sincerity
regarding its call for the democratization of the Middle East is
due to personal animosity toward George W. Bush. Reviewing the European
media in recent weeks substantiates this observation. Two days before
his official State visit to the U.K. the British press published
the results of the latest public opinion poll. Some 60% of the British
considered that President Bush is “a primary threat to World
peace”; only 7% thought he was “a good leader”;
and as many as 37% considered him as “a quack”. Thus
it seems that the American President has become part and parcel
of America’s image problem.
What is to be done specifically to put spirit and muscles into
the Bush Nov 6 speech? I suggest the following:
1. Resuming an active US peace-making role between Palestinians
and Israelis. What more noble goal than to put an end to a century-long
period of mutual hatred, suffering and bloodshed. It is also a
sin quo non for establishing a sustainable democratization in
the Middle East. Arab regimes have used the highly emotive Palestinian
Question as an excuse for their authoritarian practices. Some
few years ago the World had come very close to an equitable resolution
of the conflict had it not been for extremists on both sides.
The silent majorities have yet to have an opportunity to vote
on a historical compromise of the kind entailed in the Road Map,
and Camp David I and II. The October 12 Geneva Accord arrived
at by Israeli and Palestinian Peace advocates is a giant step
in the right direction.
2. Aid-Trade-Investment Conditionality. Democracy to take root
and survive should not be imposed by external armed forces. This
would be self-defeating let alone the stark contradiction in terms.
More effective and lasting is conditioning favorable aide, trade,
and investments terms for gradual but concrete steps toward full
democracy in each Middle Eastern Country. This strategy has been
effective in bringing about and sustaining an Egyptian-Israeli
peace treaty. It has equally motivated others in the region and
elsewhere in the Third World to engage in serious economic reform.
We have seen the same strategy working in Europe. Those countries
in Southern and Eastern Europe eager to join the European Union
were told of the twin conditionality of democracy and market economy.
The EU has subsequently grown from seven to fifteen to twenty-five
countries. At present Europe is more democratic, united, peaceful
and prosperous than ever in the last ten centuries.
3. Building on regional Liberal Traditions. President Bush has
correctly noted on several occasions, the last of which was in
his Nov. 6th speech, that there is no contradiction between Islam
and democracy. After all, the two biggest Muslim countries, Indonesia
and Bangladesh have elected democratic governments and women prime
ministers. Many Westerners may not know that the Middle East had
more recent liberal traditions, including pluralistic multiparty
systems. The Arab Liberal Age extended from the mid-nineteen to
mid-twentieth centuries, and electoral politics extending from
the 1920’s to the 1950’s – i.e. before the advent
of military dictatorships. The US and other Western democracies
should build their quest for helping the region on this liberal
tradition. It is still part of the Arab collective memory.
4. Invigorating Partnership with Civil Society Organizations.
In a time when ruling elites are too fossilized to change themselves
or to allow others to bring about badly needed changes, it is
Civil Society Organizations (CSO’s) that are taking the
initiative. At the risk of being shut down or its leaders being
administratively detained, many Arab CSO’s have spoken out
for political and cultural reforms. They have not waited for official
approval. Our Ibn Khaldun Center reopened on June 30th, i.e. on
the third anniversary of closing it down and incarcerating 27
of its associates (the night of June 30th 2000) by the Egyptian
authorities. Saudi intellectuals have been loudly and forcefully
demanding sweeping reforms. Palestinian and Israeli moderates
have been searching for common grounds for years and recently
they found enough of it to sign a “virtual” peace
accord in Geneva last month. Similar initiatives have been under
way in Syria and Tunisia despite growing repression. It is this
budding Arab that provides the effective infrastructure for democracy.
Its counterparts in the US and other Western democracies must
stretch helping hands across the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.
Arabs have long lamented past betrayals by the West. President
George Bush’s Nov. 6th speech is a promise to correct the
historical record. Let us all make sure that the promise is fulfilled.
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