There is No Alternative but Peace in the Middle East
2004
A few days have passed since the thirtieth anniversary of the October
War (Yom Kippur), and a quarter of a century since the signing of
the Camp David peace treaty between Egyptian President Anwar Sadat
and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, under the auspices of
the American President Jimmy Carter. This double October anniversary
profoundly symbolizes the Middle East problem-- the elements of
the conflict, as well as the elements of the solution. It is a war
between the Arabs and Israel, the only way out being an American-brokered
peace. This has been the solution since the first Arab-Israeli war
in 1948. Certainly, Arabs and Israelis alone are capable of initiating
any war, but, to date, at least six wars later, they are incapable
of putting an end to the war and initiating peace by themselves.
The two parties need to achieve this under international auspices--
American, to be precise. It is also clear that if either of the
two parties proposed an initiative for peace, such a move would
not be completed without the involvement of other foreign parties,
one of which would have to be the United States. This applied to
the armistice of 1948, halting the tripartite aggression (1956),
the cease-fire in the Six-Day War and Resolution 242 (1967), the
cease-fire in the October War and Resolution 338 (1973), the Camp
David Agreement (1978), the peace conference in Madrid (1991), the
Oslo accord (1993), the second Camp David negotiations and the Taba
talks (2000), and, finally, U.S. President George Bush's initiative,
known as the "Road Map" (2003).
The United States, therefore, has become a permanent party in the
conflict, in war and in peace. It provides large amounts of aid
to Israel, as well as to a number of Arab countries, and has huge
oil interests in the Gulf area, especially in Saudi Arabia. This
clear American integration may be one of the reasons for its presence
in and large influence on managing the conflict, in war and in peace.
No matter how negative the Arab public opinion is towards the United
States, due to its clear prejudice in favor of Israel, most observers
agree that it is in the interest of the United States that conditions
must improve in the Middle East.
It is in its interest that peace prevails between the Arabs and
Israel, especially since the end of the Cold War and the collapse
of the Soviet Union, for the United States has no enemy or competitor
in the region any more. This domineering and permanent presence
of the United States in the Arab- Israeli conflict, as in other
conflicts in the region and the world, does not negate the role
of regional parties in inflaming or calming down the conflict. Dramatic
examples of this are the Egyptian President's initiatives for war
(1973) and peace (1977). In this context, let us go back to talking
about the peace initiative proposed by Saudi Prince Abdallah, adopted
by the Beirut Arab Summit. The Initiative is based on three main
pillars: Israeli withdrawal from Arab land occupied in 1967 - the
West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Syrian Golan Heights, and the
establishment of a Palestinian state next to Israel, in return for
a permanent peace and a full Arab recognition of Israel, in terms
of its existence and borders. Despite an initial international welcome
for Prince Abdallah's peace initiative, and despite the fact that
it was one of the main references in ensuing American peace plans,
including the Road Map, the sounds of the armed clash between the
Israelis and the Palestinians continued. The escalating tempo of
the suicide-revenge cycle between the two parties , in addition
to the regional and international preoccupation with the war in
Iraq (since the spring of 2003), led to a receding interest in the
Saudi initiative.
It is important, however, that all powers that believe in peace,
Arab, Israeli and international, revive interest in this initiative,
and envelop it, as they enveloped and supported the Road Map. Any
regression or slack in this context would mean relinquishing the
arena to the enemies of peace and the warmongers on both sides,
and continuing the bloodshed of Palestinians and Israelis. This
is in addition to the impossibility of ensuring that the armed conflict
will not spill out of its confines in Palestine into neighboring
countries, especially Syria and Lebanon. We have already seen an
example of this in the Israeli air raid on a position in Syria,
with an Israeli claim that it is a training site for terrorists.
Peace is the best strategic option for Arabs and Israelis. I concentrate,
for the balance of this article, on the importance of this option
to the Arabs, leaving the discussion over its benefits for Israel
to Israeli researchers and analysts themselves. It is worth noting,
however, that all public opinion surveys there reveal that over
70% of Israelis want peace, with the recognition of a Palestinian
state. The Israeli public has realized that it is impossible to
continue repressing Palestinians and ignoring their legitimate national
demands, regardless of Israel's military might, its technological
capability and its economic superiority.
What is important now is that the Arab public, in turn, realizes
that it is impossible to vanquish or annihilate Israel, regardless
of the number of suicide bombings. It is also important to realize
that no matter how long conflicts persist, they are bound to come
to an end with peaceful settlements and historic reconciliation.
These settlements and reconciliation must include mutual compromises.
This is how conflicts in Europe, East Asia, Ireland and South Africa
came to an end. In each of these regions, peace, followed by economic
cooperation and then prosperity, replaced the conflict. The only
extended and raging conflicts remain in the Middle East and South
Asia and some areas in the African southern desert. International
reports indicate that these areas are the poorest, most corrupt,
most repressive and destroyed in the world. (The most recent of
these reports was published by the United Nations Development Program
in 2002, entitled: the Arab Human Development Report.) The Arab-Israeli
conflict, like all conflicts around the world, cannot be settled
by war, regardless of time, due to the mixture of geographic, historic,
cultural, religious, identity and interest considerations involved.
If the public is convinced of this impossibility, decision makers
will work hard to reach settlements and bring about historic reconciliation
that saves face and respects the interests and dignity of all parties
involved, and put an end to bloodletting and destruction.
This is what Sadat saw in 1978, and what the Saudi Crown Prince
aspired to a quarter of a century later. We do not need to wait
another quarter of a century, or even one more year, to re-discover
the same.
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