2004

1. Religious Narrative. The militants’ reading of Islam as enunciated in its Holy Book, The Qura’an and Prophet Muhammed’s Sunna is that it is the perfect religion, culminating and scaling all other monotheistic religions – i.e. Judaism and Christianity. Its uniqueness lies in its simplicity and lucidity, i.e. needs no clergy to mediate between the Creator God Almighty and the creatures / believers. Islam’s superiority draws from its comprehensiveness, as a belief system, a worship system, and a transactional system of rules and regulations to guide Muslims in everyday life. The militants further believe that strict adherence to its precepts and rules (Sharia’a), ensures a perfect community (Umma) in this world, and access to Heavenly Paradise in the thereafter.

2. Historical Narrative. For the militants, the history of Islam and Muslims is broadly divided in two stages. There was the Golden Age of the Prophet Muhammed and his four Guided Successors (Chalifs) in which the Community of the Believers (Umma) was pious, virtuous, just and strong. Muslims were the masters of the world in all respects – from culture and science to commerce and military. They had an empire that extended from the Great Wall of China in the East, to the Iberean Peninsula on the Atlantic West. The second stage was one of steady decline and decay, as Muslims increasingly strayed away from “The Straight Path” of Islam, resulting in the disintegration of their empire. Ultimately, Muslims were encroached on by non-Muslims, and the “Abode of Islam” (Dar al-Islam) was colonized by the heathens and infidels, who haven’t ceased their humiliation.

3. Moral Narrative. To restore their souls, dignity, land and power (ezzah), Muslims must rid themselves of all repugnant thoughts, beliefs and behaviors, and go back to the “Straight Path” of Islam (al Sirat al Mustaqim). In so doing, Muslims would be rightfully repenting to Allah Almighty, emulating the Prophet and his blessed companions. They will obtain the same results: a virtuous, just, powerful community on earth and eternal Heaven in the Hereafter. As in most ideologies, these purified narratives are internalized in the would be Islamic “activist”; and with a dose of passion turn “militant”; and with an additional doses he (or she) would be a deployable “martyr” (shaheed). Martyrdom is the ultimate sacrifice for the Umma, Service to the Faith, and a short-cut to Eternal Heavenly Paradise.

4. Membership Profile. As in most radical movements, most Islamic activists are young, educated, idealistic, searching for individual salvation and more collective self-fulfillment. After a few years, the Movement becomes their life and career. As they invariably engage in violent actions, the movement becomes their only refuge from “hostile authorities” at home or abroad. Membership commitment to the Movement strengthens till it becomes total immersion, submergence, and submission. At this point, deploy ability of members becomes all the easier for the leadership.

5. Islamic Movements Evolutionary Trajectory. Though most Islamic movements start as local affairs, they quickly discover or contrive kinship affinities with the like-minded across national boundaries. This is often facilitated by common articles of faith, e.g. all Muslims are brothers. Religious solidarity tops all others – like race, class, and nation. It is also facilitated by common narratives and a shared perception of a real or imagined common enemy – e.g. atheist Soviets or decadent Westerners. As it becomes transnational, and with few successful exploits against enemies, such movements acquire an aura of their own and attract a broader publics of Muslim youngsters worldwide. The likes of Osama Bin Laden become folk-heroes, in as much as Che Guevara was to millions around the world in the 1960’s. As movements globalize in membership, resources, and action, they also begin to broaden their ideological reframing of issues and strategic outreach. Thus, the plight of Palestinians, Iraqis, Muslims in Philippines, Bosnia, and Chechen become a common cause for all Islamic militants, regardless of birthplace or current nationality.

6. Reasons for outrage. Other than the perceived reasons for discontent at home, the militants’ reading of the world situation adds to their outrage. The non-Muslim “Other” who is currently at the roots of dominating and exploiting the Abode of Islam (Dar al-Islam) is the West in general and the U.S. in particular. The earlier struggle to bring down the godless rulers at home may have failed or made more difficult because of their unholy alliance with or subservience to the sinister West. Therefore, the dual Jihad is justifiably directed against both of them at home and abroad. The battle-front becomes world-wide, i.e. from Philippine to U.S.A., and from Turkey to Morocco.

7. The Mobilizing Power of the Islamic Metaphor. Causes have been staunchly fought under the banners of Islam: from the anti-Shah struggle in the 1970’s, against the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan in the 1980’s, against the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon (1982-200), to the Palestinian resistance in Gaza and West Bank, to that of Chechen against the Russian Federation. While these and similar fights may have local triggers, different beginnings, and the organic or organizational links to one another, they have all discovered the potent mobilizing power of “Islam”. Some forty years ago, Clifford Geertz discovered this potential as he observed Islam in practice of both ends of the Muslim World – i.e. Indonesia and Morocco. Despite vast differences in interpretations, rituals, and religiosity, at both ends it was the Islamic metaphase that exudes an ambiguous but powerful sense of purpose and collective identity. It is this metaphor that militant Islamists have appropriated and are exploiting to the hilt.

B. What We Need to Know about Islamists?

1. Militants are not the only spokesperson for Islam or for the 1.4 billion Muslims. In fact, indisputable evidence indicates that militants are a tiny portion of Islamic activists, who are themselves a minority among today’s adult Muslims. There has been a lively debate among competing Islamic groups in nearly every Muslim country and across national borders about the “proper understanding” of Islam and the “proper conduct” of Muslims in the contemporary world. As in all debates, there are shades and nuances along both ideational and organizational lines. The debate has become more passionate since 9/11. An expanding Muslim public is alarmed by the “hijacking” of Islam by the extreme militants – i.e. the likes of Bin-Laden and / or those implicated in the 9/111 bombing and similar violent episodes. Identifying major interlocutors and mapping out the contours of this ongoing debate is only broadly noted, we need to refine and sharpen our understanding of this raging discourse.

2. Competing Islamic activists are targeting several constituencies at home and abroad, for hostile engagement, pleading for sympathetic understanding, for civilized dialogue or for constructive partnerships. At home such constituencies include the government in power, the public at large, women, and non-Muslim communities. Abroad, they include expatriate Muslims communities living in the West, Western governments, especially the U.S. At one extreme of this sought-out engagement is an open-war - e.g. Al Qae’da vs. the U.S. and its perceived allies. At the other extreme end is a quest for partnership and inclusion – e.g. the Turkish Islamic Party of Justice and Development has been actively seeking accession of Turkey into the European Union. How much support does each of these competing Islamic variants command in its respective society, and the Islamic World at large, and specifically within each of the targeted constituencies? The University of Michigan’s World Value Survey provides raw data on this and other related questions. But rigorous analysis and further research are still needed. What are the shifts underway if any, in the relative weight, influence, and language of discourse among competing and rival Islamic groups, as well as between their joint camp and the “secularists” or non-Islamists?

3. Several Islamic groups have recently disavowed violence, declared their commitment to democracy, and engagement in politics. Wherever and whenever opportunities have permitted, some of them have in fact acted accordingly – e.g. Indonesia, Morocco, Turkey, Yemen, Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain. Many observers at home and abroad are casting doubt on the sincerity of the Islamists’ commitments to democracy. Since social actors are neither born “extremists” or “moderates”, it is reasonable to search and test hypotheses bearing on conditions - structural, situational, or international – of processes which lead to either. It may very well turn that research on the issue at hand could be framed on rules and conditions of inclusion and exclusion vis-à-vis the societal and global mainstream.

4. Some ten years ago, Istanbul’s Swedish Institute hosted a conference on Islam, Democracy, and Civil Society. Taliban has just seized power in Afghanistan, and Erbikan had just been democratically voted prime minister in Turkey. One of the conference papers noted these contrasting events in the name of Islam, was titled “From Taliban to Erbikan”. Today, neither one is in power here or there but their successors and remnants are still around here and there, albeit metamorphosed. Thus Taliban has been bombarded out of power into mountainous fugitives. Erkiban’s Fadhila’ Party has metamorphosed into Andoghan’s Justice and Development Party. Between the Afghani and Turkish variants there is the Egyptian – based Muslim Brotherhood (M.B.), which has been evolving and devolving since its first inception in 1928. These tapestry of Islamic movements across the world from Indonesia to Morocco provides ample opportunities for both theoretical and policy research in social sciences.

5. When the Istanbul conference was held in the mid 1990’s, barely one-third of the World Muslims were living under democratically elected governments. Today, i.e. in less than ten years, the percentage has doubled to two thirds. Does regional neighborhood have much to do with this transition from non-democratic to democratic governance, is it internal socio-political pressures, or is it globalization?

C. What Kind of War is Winnable with Islamists?

If war starts as an idea in human mind so is peace. Terrorism and counter-terrorism are no exception, if we factor out what particular parties to a conflict use in the way of terminology – e.g. Jihad, martyrdom, suicide, or terrorism. The question, however, is that kind of war winnable by force of arms or must be fought and settled by other means? If so, what are these means? These and related questions would be at the core of policy – oriented research on Islamic movements in the 21st Century.